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CHflPTEH I

HlS'l'OBICAl, BACKGROUND

The problem of unity and mult1plio1ty in psyohology is an old
one, dating baok to Ar1stotle and mants first not1ons of psychology as .. soienoe.

Ar1stotle t a doctrine ot matter and form pro-

vided the philosoph1cal basis for a psyohology which held man to
be one substance, a. composite of body &nd soul.

St. 'l:homas Aqu1wu

ohrist1anized Aristote11an psyohology und developed it lnto a
un1f1ed system.

r.lhis 'l'homlstlc system was one of tho greatest

1nfluenoes in phllosoph1cal and psyCholog1oal thought up to the
seventeenth oentury.1

Medieval man, therefore, had a simple out-

look on h1mself and the things about h1m.

He was a. single un1f1ed

baing w1th one final gael 1n l1fe, un1ty with God.

All the other

th1ngs on earth had but one purpose, to help h1m to th1s goal.
It was not unt1l the t1me of Rene Descartes that th1s un1f1ed
~1oture

of man and the world was destroyed.

From the time that

Desoartes rejected knowledge by 1mmed1ate exper1enoe, modern

1

2
~hllosophy

and psychology were forced to take an indlreot approaoh

to the reallty of the outside world.
1s an 14

~

instead ot an

~

And since our knowledge

guo, according to the Carteslans,

the problem arose a8 to how a totally splr1tual entlty suOh as
~n

idea could be oaused by the physloal objeot outside.

As a

result ot the above reasoning, there arose ln psyChology a dlchotomy between the sp1rltual side of man and the materlal side
--between the mind and the body.2
There followed atter thls a 11ne of philosophers and psychologlsts who not only dld not brldge the mind-body diohotomy, but
made

the oleavage Wider, even tendlng to atomize man into his

oomponent parts.
~hilosophers

atomism.
~ooke,

Thomas Hobbes went back to the anclent Greek

for an answer, reviving the theory of materialistio

The Brltish empiriOists tollowed 1n chronologioal order:

Berkeley, and Hume.

And 1n Just as striot logioal order

they hewed away what remained ot medieval psyOhology's whole man.
As Adler ssys:

-As a result of the simple error of treating

sensations or ideas as that whiob

(J4~)

ot as l.llIl l?z :-hioh (J:!.9.\!2.) man knows what

is known instead

he knows • • •
the deTelopment of psyOhological dootrine from Looke to Hume
(.9.Y.!$1)

ended in subjeotivism, phenomenalism and posltlvism.-'

But lt

was Hume who finally oarrled Cartesian psychology to its logical
2Ibid ., pp. 68-75; William Turner, H1story 2t Pb11osoRbY
(Boston. 1903). pp. 450-457_

J Adler. p__ 77.

destruot1ve oonolus1ons.

He reasoned oorreotly that 1t we have

cert1tude only of our own subjeot1ve mod1f1oat1ons, then we have
~o

~ot

knowledge of a rea11ty outside of us.

Substance, then, does

ex1st for us, only the acc1dents whioh are. for a time con-

stitutive of our mental state.

For the Ego itself1s noth1ng

~lse than an aoc1dental grouping ("heap or oOlleotionw)4 of sensations.
~here

Our 1deas are not caused by the outside world because

is no suoh thing as oausality.

If there were, we could

perce1ve oausal relations 1n our 1mmediate percept.
~e

Therefore,

are nothing but a bundle of sensations acoidentally and for

a time grouped together.

So say Hume and his followers.

Thus fell (or good, 1t seemed, the medieval notion of a un1fled psychology of man.

Un1ty was y1elding plaoe to multip1101ty.

prom the-t1me of Hume forward there was a noted tendenoy to make
psychology e1ement1sti0 and emp1rioa1. 5
The man who contr1buted perhaps more than anyone else to the
progress of elementlsm and empir101sm 1n psychology was W1lhelm
6
NUndt, the founder ot modern ..., eXper1mental psychology.
We w1l1
4

Hume.

In9ulr~

goncernlng HYmJP Undergtandlng, Sect10n III.

SIn almost all the physlcal sOiences, phys1Cs, chemistry,
etc., the tendency toward analysis and .tomism
hold. For further comments on this tendency 1n
~he sciences see W11lis D. El11s, A §9Uroe Boo~ 2t Gesta~t Ps~
bholo~v (New York, 1935), p. 2; Kurt Koffka, pr1n9iRl~ Q( Gestalt fsYCh9log1 (New York, 1935), pp. 5-9.
~lo1ogy, anatomy,
~d. already taken

6 Edwin G. Bor1ng,
1950), p. 316.

~ork,

A History

.Q.( Exper,mental Psychology (New

4

study here flrst Wundt's lnfluence in making modern psychology
empirical.

\,tJe

will then study his psychologlcal system as such,

bringing ln his elementlsm.
In the mld-nineteenth century, the physical sciences were
fast becoming the ·sacred oow R that we know them as today_

The

work done in biology, anatomy, physics, and all the other ·positive"? Bclences showed the 1ncreasing interest of men in those
fields.

The "works of August Comte gave philosophical sanotion

to this work; in fact, it elevated the physical sciences to a
posltion above all other solences, a position they had never enjoyed before.

It is no wonder, then, that Wilhelm Wundt, the

young student at the Berlin Inst1tute, should be strongly influenced.

As with

80

many other great men, the Zeitgellt was mainly

responsible for the choice of his life's work.
1t

But in particular,

was the influenoe of suoh physiCists as W'eber, Muller and

Helmholtz that made the young Wundt so interested in applying
the methods of phySiology to psyChology.8
In 1873-4 Wundt published hls monumental PhY8iolgg.oa. l!zenology, the foundation stone of muoh of his later work.
~ork,

In thls

Wundt broke with previous tradition in psyChological ex-

periments and 1nsisted upon so1entifio objeotivity in every step

?The word ·positive- is used here to connote the type of
soienoe Comte was referring to in his work by that name. It is
mainly concerned with concrete physical facts rather than theory
or abstraction from those facts.
8
Adler, p. 84.

ot the prooess.

The stlmulus was to be objectively knowable and.

If possIble, measurable.

ThIs would gIve rise, In Wundt's theory,
to an objeotlvely knowable and measurable response. 9 As Gardner

Murphy says emphasizlng Wundt·s innovatIons ln the psychology
of the tImes:

-In this formulation ($ee aboveJ Wundt radIcally

broke with the Introspeotive psyoholog1sts from Hobbes onward.
For no matter how much emphasis had been given to behavior. and
to stimul1 oausing behavlor, • • • no one had grasped in its full
entlrety the sclentifio implloations of stating mental events
1n relation to objectively knowable and measurable stimuli and
reaotiona"w 10
Introspeotlon. however, was by no means negleoted by wundt.
It was used as a primary tool in all Wundtian experiments.

'l'he

differenoe was that now the physIologIcal prooesses preoeding
Introspection were studIed along w1th theIr concomItant psychlc
experienoe.

For a psychic modifioation was always experienoed

parallel with the physiologloal modifioations in the sense organs.
But there was
to wundt. 11

~

oausal Interaotion between the two accordIng

W1th thIs theory, Wundt thought, one could gaIn know-

ledge about sUbjecttve mental states trom a study of exoitations
In the sense organs and the nervous system, and vIsa versa.

It

9Gardner Murphy t HAstQrloal IntrQduo"tAQ!l!.Q. t1ode:rn Pszchology
(New York, 1950), p. 150.
10~.

l1aor1ng, p. 3'3; Murphy, p. 150.

6

It 1s olear, therefore, that Wundt was a psycho-physloal parallel1st.

In this, aa 1n many other of his theorIes, he has Influenoed

many modern psyoholog1oal sohools.

12

Wundt's pSYOhological laboratory at Leipzig was the first
of its k1nd in the world.

It was here that Wundt and h1s fol-

lowers oarried on their tremendously produot1ve work 1n psycho10g1cal experimentation.

From this laboratory went leading psy-

Chologlsts well lndoctrlnated ln Wundtian physiologioal psyohology.
These men made the1r mark in universitles allover the world.

It

would be diffloult, therefore, to exaggerate the widespread influence that Wundt had on modern PS10hology through the -Institute-

~t Leipzig, as he called the laboratory.l,
As,

to Wundt's e1emeuti.tlc system of psyohology, one notes

the same penohant for preoision and organizat10n that obaraoterizec
his insistenoe on an objeotlve sclentifl0 approach to all of psychology_

wundt's methodology. hls genius at organization and

system were, perhaps, h1s mOlt outstandlng oontributlon to the
14
lnfant psyohology of his time.
However, the oontent of his
12

. Titohenerts instruoturallsm 1s probable the best example of
th1s. Tltchener took over Wundt's notion of psyohophysioal parallelism 'unoritloally,- says Heidbreder (see Edna He1dbreder. Seven
PsYoholO$lies (New York, 1933), p. 126) _ ~ve shall see that Gestalt
psyohology also oame under the Wundt1an influenoe in this as well
as ln many other matters.
lJaorlng, p. 324.
l~urphY p. lSS- t-Iu:rphy says: "He ['wundtJ did not oooupy
h1mself greatiy w1th new k1nds of exper1ments. His task was oh1efly the extens10n and systemat1zation of stud1es already inaugurated.'

7

system 1s also important beoause of the lntluenoe 1t bad on other
systems of psychology.
As we aaw, introspeotion was ot the essenoe of
chology.

~undt1an

pay-

Th1s ls brought out 1n Wundt's descr1ption of the func-

tion of psyohology_
PsyObolog), has to lnvest1sete that whloh we oall lnternal
experienoe--i.e., our own sensat10ns and feeling, our
thought fnd volltlo~-1n oontradlst1nct1on to the objeots
of external experlenoe--whloh form the subject matter of
natural soience. i S

Some modern psyohologlsts hold that Wundt even dIminished the
lmportanoe of the ph,s1oal ln hls emphasIs on the PsyChl0. 16
Bu.t the important thl1l8 to note

18

that everythIng ln )Jundt t S

.rstem was oenteredaround the subjeotlve exper1neoe.
perlenoe, arrived at

simple sensatlons,

by

'I'h1s ex-

1ntrospeotlon, was divided lnto two olass•• :

and feelinga.

sensations were ultImate or

elementary forms ot exper1ence aroused as soon

8S

the 1ncoming

impula. of the stimulated sense organ reached the bra1n.

FeelIngs

or feeling qualitles are aroused when oertain sensatIons combine
1n a total experienoe.

These in turn can oomb1ne in oertain seQuences to form emotions. 1? Later, all these elements are synthesized or laid hold ot by the lndiv1dual to form a olear intra-

15wOodworth, p. 24.

See also Boring, p.

,,2.

16aoring, p. " , . Ho S8YS: -In th1s manner Wundt, for all
that he founded 'phys101ogical pSYChology' and wrote Ohapters
on the nervous system, really went far toward dismisslng the body
rrom psychology.17Murphy, pp .. 151-1,52.

8

spective consc1ous state. 18
apperception.

Wundt oalled th1s clear experience

The results of this whole process were then tab-

ulated and oategorized. by Wundt in somewhat the same fashion as
a physioal sOientist tabulates and categorizes new elements dlscovered in a laboratory.19
One of the most lmportant.effeots Wundtlan psychology had
on the Bucoeed1ng psycholog1es was to foster the increas1ng t.ndency toward analys1s and the emphasls of parts over the whole.
Struoturalism and association1sm, two contemporary sohools wholly
in the Wundt1an trad1tlon, are good examples of this tendency.
They hold as the object of psycholog1cal research the subJect1ve
modifioat1ons of the exper1enc1ng person.

The1r ma1n pr1nc1ples

deal with methods of oombining sense elements.

However, as Bor1ng

says. the successors of Wundt put more emphas1s on the mechan1cal
~lys1s

of introspect1ve states than perhaps wundt would have

wished.
as

stat~q

They also treat sensat10ns, 1mages, and s1mple fee11ngs
bits of oonsciousness lnstead of "mental processes,-

as Wundt had called them. 20

All th1s engendered a false element-

lB
•• p. lS4. Murphy says that Wundt oalled the process
whereby 1tfid
e various elements are oombined and related to form
a un1ty. qreat1ve sYnthesis.
19Woodworth, pp. 2S and 26.
20 aor1ng , p. 329. Bor1ng says of the predom1nant lntrospectlonism of the t1me: ·Untl1 phenomenolog1cal observat10n eventually came ·lnto fashion in the laboratory, practically all lntrospection was analyt1cal; and lntrospective analysis meant the
resolution of exper1ence into oompounds of sensations or other
elementa llke them."

9

ism, one which ultimately would give r1se to such react10ns as
21
Gestalt psyChology and benaVlor1sm.
But before treat1ng these
latter two schools, we will first glanoe br1efly at struotural1sm
and assooiation1sm, the reoipients ofl'liundt's full psyoholog1cal
her1tage.
The struoturalism of Titchener was the natural immed1ate
off-spring of Wundt's psychology.

w1th a rew changes, as we have

seen, the struotura11sts took over wundtfs elementism oompletely.22
However. 1itohener 1nsisted upon subJeotive mental states of the
exper1enoing subJeot as the

~

real object ot' psychology_

'8y-

phology stud1es only "exper1enoe dependent on anexper1enc1ng
~erson." aooording to lj,'itohener. 2) Common sense itself 1s at~aoked

by Titohener because, as he says, 1t makes the subject

add elements to the lntrospeotive data wh10h are not really present. 24 There was great need. therefore. of the -trained introspeotlonlst- who would be able to g1ve a totally nalve desoriptlon
of hls subJectlve states without add1ng or detract1ng anyth1ng.25
~e

w1l1 see that the Gestalt psyohologists a180 put emphas1s on
21llU4., p. JJ 4 •

22Murphy, p. 214. Murphy adds that T1tohener also tended
slmp11ty Wundt'a system whioh was, admittedly, qu1te extens1ve and oomplex.
~o

2)Heldbreder, p. 122.
24.l.1U4.. p. 124.
25Ibld., p. 128.

-

ID
subjective states but only as phenomena refleoting obJectlve
data, not as pytely subJeotlve states.

For the Gestalt psy-

Cholog1st phenomena lnolude objeots and mean1ng, whereas "the
stra1ght and narrow path of orthodoxy for Wundt and T1tohener
led only through pure descr1pt10n w1thout 1nterpretat1on. n26
So muoh for T1tchener's structurallsm; now to the next he1r
1n Wundt's psycholog1cal kingdom.

To trace the oomplete h1story

of assooiat10n1sm, one would have to go back to Ar1stotle and
his basic rules of memory:

s1milarity, contrast, and contigu1ty.

While a complete history trom Ar1stotle down to the present time
is not neoessary, a briet look at some of tne leading associationists is in order.

The constant references of the Gestalt

psyChologists to assoc1ationism and their oft-repeated denunoiations of the associationists' most sacred prinoiples make it
a fair surmise that aSSOCiationism is the chief opponent ot
Gestalt psyohology_

For associationisM is the symbol of the

spirit of atomism.
David Hartley. the relatively obscure eighteenth oentury
physioian, can be called the founder of associationism.

Hume,

it is true, had seen the necessity of having some laws for the
grouping together of sensations and 1deas.

He had stressed re-

26BOring, p. 592. Tltohener often referred to himself and
his followers as -existentialists· beoause of their strong emphasis on the study of statio subjective states. The functionalists, en the other hand, stress operation, adjustment, and
adaption as the object of psychological researoh. See Murphy,
p. 214; Woodworth, p_ 31.

11
petition, sImIlarIty, and oontiguity.

However, it was left

to Hartley to establish assooiationism as a working system.
Hartley was the fIrst psyohologist to do extensive work in the
physiological slde of mental states.

He also laid stress on

the rules of oont1guity and repetItion underlying the association
of ideas. 27
The two lUlls, James and John Stuart, together with Alexander Baln are responsIble for oonverting assoolationism into
a throughly SCientIfIc psyohology, a purely mechanical prInciple
of the oompounding of ideas. 28

It was Da1n, however, who really

brought the phllosophlcal psyChology of assoclat1onism to the
polnt where the solentifio psyChology of Wundt could take over.29
For Daln represents the culmlnation of assooiatlonlsm and the
begInnlng of its absorption into physiologlcal psychology.

But

Bain dld not deny that pSYChology Is a solenoe In its own right,
:\'

a solenoe whloh st1ll had as Its subject matter the phenomena
of mental 11fe.

He was, as Hartley before hlm and Wundt after

hIm, a psyohophyslcal parallellst.

'l'hus he saw the neoessity

21sorIng, pp. 19,-200.
28

~., p. 219.
John Stuart MIll even called psyohology
the SCience of mental ohemistry. It 1s obvious tt~t the influeno
of soientism had thoroughly infeoted assooiationism.

29Wundt aotually made assooIat1onism the bas1c pr1nolple
of h1s element1st psychology. In assooiat1onism, wundt found
the fundamental prInciple of oonneot1on between elements. fi'or
more on th1s see: Boring, pp. 219 and 337-338.

12
of studying the physlolor;ical processes as an 1nd.ioation of and
aid to the knowledge of mental 11fe.

His work on human volitlon

shows that he 1n no way wanted psychology to be oonverted into
a oompletely materia11st1c phys1olog1oal so1enoe.

:;0

Our latter-d.ay associatlonism stemmlng from Edward L. '1'horn_
d1ke and his followers shows probably the olearest· ear-t.aarks
of a system which 1s the ch1ld of 1ts phllosoph'nal and psyohologlcal parenta.ge.

It 1s ln the complete tradltion of the eensa-

t10nlsm spr1nging from Brltish empirlcism.

At the same time,

it ls under the strong influence of the movement of sOientlsm.
Adding to th1s latter trend of so1entism ln assoclationlsm is
the work of Ivan Pavlov, whose eXperlments on condltioned. reflexes have been thoroughly lnoorporated 1n the assoclationist
theory of learning.)l
The reason behind the associat1onists' interest in learning
11es 1n the fact that they are constantly forced to explain why
ideas occur in clusters and of tell in regular sequences as they
do.

HaVing rejected the real world, substance, and oausality,

they must necessarily f1nd some reason for the apparent unity
of our sensations.

'l.'hey respond that the clusters and sequences

were formed in past experience by the Jo1nlng of sensat10ns that
ocourred together or 1n 1mmed1ate successlon and were cont1guous

30

~.,

pp. 233-240.

) lwoodworth , pp. 56-66.

13
1n space and time.

32

In other words, the sensations occurred

together or1ginally, henoe they are taken as one group by the
percip1ent.
Such an explanation as this for the prooess of perception
seems to the Gestalt psyoholog1st very "atomistic" and "haphazard
oompared with the Gestalt "dynam1c whole R process.

',the Gestalt

theorists point out with vehemence that in the assooiation1st
group1ng of sensations any image could be connected with any
other; it is just a matter of chance conJunction. J3 As a typioal
example of assooiat1on1st theory of perception, Katz, one of
Gestalt's ohief exponents, g1ves the follOWing:

·Van11la Ioe

Cream - Cold + Sweet + Vanl1la Aroma + Softness + Yellow.- J4
The purpose of the example 1s obvlously to show the totally pleoe
meal independent oharaoter of the elements ln assoolationlst
perception.

We w1l1 see how the Gestalt psychologlsts form the1r

theory of percept10n as one d1ametr1oally opposed to that of
assoclat1onism.
What was the outcome, then, of the phllosoph1cal and sOientlfic trends

tr~t

we have seen stem from suCh ph11osophers

as Desoartes and suoh soientifl0 psychologlsts as Wundt and his
followers?

We now have in psyohology a plcture of man sect10ned

'2Woodworth, p. 38.
"DaV1d Katz, GestAlt Psychology (New York, 1950), p. 6.

34Ibid.

14
off, cut up lnto the component elements of his subjective sensations.

He 1s no longer a unified entity, a composite of body

and soul as pSYChologists held in the middle ages.

Assooia-

tionism with its artiflcial rules of sensat10n tries to staple
man together into an aCCidental bundle of lmages and ldeas.
It 1s a perfect example of what had happened to psyohology by
the turn of the twentleth century.

The parts had taken complete

predominanoe over the whole.
The questlons that men began to ask. however. at about this
time were lndlcatlve of the reaotion about to take place.

How

oan a sclence, they asked, whloh atomizes man into a mere set
of sensatlons clalm to be a true psyChology, that ls, a sOience
of the whole man?

How can such a solence of mere stlmull, re-

sponses, and sense-bundles explaln such an experlence as the
enjoyment of a work of art, or the sudden disoovery of a truth?'S
The unrelated psychic elements and psyslological prooesses that
lnterest the psyohologlsts we have just dlsoussed are so far
apart from the real life of man that they seem to belong to a
different universe.

The strong reaotion that consequently took

place ln psyOhology at th1s time took the form of two completely
dlfferent sohools of thought, behaviorlsm and Gestalt
psyohology.
,
Behaviorism answered the problem by reject1ng the notion that
psyOhology 1s a science of the whole man; 1t 1s only the science
"Koftke, ~ prino1ples • • • , p. 19.

l.5
of man's phys10al reactions.

l'he Gestaltist tr1es to give a

unified picture of man, especially in his perception.
Behav10rism is a typioally Amer1can product.
aI~

It began here

has had its greatest development on American 13011.

It 113

speoifically a reaction against the "vagueR introspectlonlsm
of the orthodox psyohology of 1ts t1me. J6
a simple outlook on life.

The behav10rist has

He asks only for the cold facts of

objeotive behavior as the subjeot of his psyohology.

He measures

the stimulus and the response of a g1ven orga..'1.1sm 1n a given
situation, tabulates his find1ngs and then oalls a def1nite halt
to peyoholog10al 1nvest1gation.

For the behaviorist does not

believe oonsoiousness should oome into psyoholog1cal invest1gation.

The data aoquired in his laboratory may get more oomplex

as the st1muli or objeotive s1tuation beoome more 1nvolved, but

it w1ll never be neoessary to pass over into another realm of
be1ng for an ult1mate explanat1on.

The phys10al measur1ng ap-

paratus and the mathematical formula are the ult1mate explanations. J ?
This ·pos1tive- attitude would. naturally appeal to the pract cal minded American.

It was, beSides, perfeotly 1n line

~'41th

functiona11sm that was sweeping the country a.t the time. 38

36Borins, p. 643.

J7~.,

pp. 640-644; Murphy, pp. 259-267.

38 Boring, pp. 587 and 621.

the
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It only grew sharper through the opposltlon that came from the
die-hard. followers of 'l'ltchener.

No wonder, then, that behavior-

ism saw such an immediate growth ln America.
On the Cont lnent, too', there was a react ionary movement,
I

surprisingly dlfferent in nature from behavlorlsm, whlch was
soon to flnd its way to this oountry and prove ltself a flt match
for lts recalcltrant behaViorist brother.
Gestalt psychology was not a reaction against the introspective aspect of the psyOhology of its day, nor dld it decry its
sCientlsm.

The main oontention of the Oestaltist was with the

elementistic or atomlstl0 aspect of that solenoe.

Borlng sum-

marlzes lts position in this way:
Orthodox psyoholOSY ln 1910 was (1) experlmental, (il) introspective, (ill) elementlstl0 and (iV) associatlonistlc.
Behavlorlsm and Gestalt psyohology were agreed only on the
first: both sohools thought psychology should and could be
experlmental. Introspeotlon behaviorism rejected in toto,
whereas Gestalt psyohology plaoed great stor~9upon the
phenomenal description of direot experience.)
In general, then. Gestalt psychology ls a solence whlch
endeavors to bring unlty back into the solence of man.

It in-

Sists, lndeed, on the basiC unity of man and the universe around
him.
sum

According to the Gestaltist, we can only explaln the total
experlence of man by returning to an holistlC psychology.

As Kurt Kotfke says:
Thus the historian was right when he insisted that •• _,
generally speaking, it would be lapos sible to i.ncorporate

J9~ ••

pp.

642-643.
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the data of culture within current psyChologica4osystems
without destroying the true menaing of culture.
And speaking of the older psychology he says:
The dilemma of psychology, then, was this: on the one hand
it was 1n possesslon of explanatory princlples in the sclentlflc sense, but these principles did not solve the most
important problems of psyohology, whloh remained outslde
its scope; on the other hand, it dealt With these very
problems, but without sClentif1c explanatory prlUf1ples;
1Q understand took the place of ~ explain • • •
Max.'iertheimer sums up the case for Gestalt psyChology in thls
way:
The tundamental lCformula" of Gestalt theory might be expressed ln thls way: There are wholes, the behav10ur of
l<lhich 1s not determ1ned by that of thelr individual elements
but where the part-processes are themselves determined by
the intrinsic nature of the whole. It is the hope ~f Gestalt theory to determine the nature of such wholes. ~
The Oestal't hollstic theory of perception, which is the subJeot
of this thesis, 1s one of Gestalt' s most e·ffect ive arguments
1n oontemporary psyOhology's press1ng issue of un1ty and multip1101ty or, as Gardner Murphy terms it, the "issue of wholes
and parts •• 43

* * * * * * * * * *
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The purpose of this thesis 1s to study the theory of perceptlon as proposed by the Gestalt school of psyohology and oome
to some judgments to the valldlty of Ita olaim.

In thls study

we wl11 not cover all of Gestalt peroeptlon theory but only that
proposed by the Berlln School of Gestalt psychology.

'I'he main

It

proponents of thls school are Drs. wolfgang Kohler, Kurt Koffke,
and Max Werthe1mer.
Although Gestalt psychology is ohlefly an eXperlmental
sCientlfio theory J, It Is.!l2t malnly eXperimentatlon that we are
Interested in here.

It is the theory involved in Gestalt sellse

perception t}mt we will be almost exolusively Involved wlth.
For, as Fr. Vinoent Herr, 5.J., says, "Gestalt pSYChology Is
not only an emplrloal solenoe, It Is highly speoulatlve. w44
In thls thesis the Gest,lt view of peroept10n 1s given exactly as it is proposed by the Gestaltlsts.

I nelther add to

it nor detract from it in any way untll the last ohapter on oriticlsm.

It should be noted, then, that the first part of thls

thesis does not necessarlly lntend to give an objeotlve view
of the Gestalt-associatlonlst quarrel.

It gives the Gestalt

view.

44VInoent V. Herr, S.J., "Gestalt PsychologJ, Empirical or
RatIonal," Essays in i10dern Scholastic1sm, Anton C. Pegls ed.
(Westminister, 1944), p. 243_ Herr says: "Gestalt psychology
then, in its entirety, ought not be called empirical, nor even
Investigative only • • • It 1s both investigative and speculatIve
to a high degree, with probably much more lnt>istcIlce upon the
speculative or philosoph1cal aspects • • • n
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The procedure

follo~<ied.

in this thesis is the usual one.

A history was f1rst given, the purpose of which was to pose the
problem, atoIllizat lon of kllott..rledge t and paint out that by the
end of the ninHteenth century atomism was the accepted dootrine
in most sCiences, especially psyChology.

'I'he seoond. chc.pter

deals with the theory of perception itself, showing the three
general environments involved in every perception!

the geo-

graph1cal, physiological, 8.nd the behavioral.

'11he th1rd chapter

deals with the complex theory of isomorphism.

It entails the

Gestalt application of the concept of structure to the three
above-mentioned

envlror~ents.

In the last chapter a study is

made of the philosoph1cal imp11cations of the Gestalt theory,
and a Judgment is then attempted as to the validity of the

Ge~

talt doctrine.
For the purpose of simplification only the two main schools
oPposing Gestalt psychology are oons1dered here, namely, associationism and behaViorism.
to these two sOhools.

I use several different terms to refer

Some of these terms are used gener10ally

to refer to e1ther sohoo•• whereas others refer speCifically
to one or the other school depending upon the speoial aspeot
or dootrine that lam particularly 1nterested in at the time.
For instance, the terms "atomist" and "positivist" are 3E:n:lerio
arJ.d refer to the members of either sohool; whereas when I use the
terw"elementarlst a or "sensatlonist,· I refer to members of the
associationist sOhool; and when I use the term "mechanist,· I mean
it more properly to refer to a member of the behaviorist school.

CHAP/rER

II

GES'l'ALT PERCEPTION

The first chapter has given, at least in outline form, the
picture of psychology

8S

it looked to the observer around the end

of the nineteenth century.
with two main ideas:

It was a psyChology thoroughly imbued

the necessity of a scientific approaoh to

psychology and the atomization of the picture of man to its small
est constituents.

Although the Gestalt psychologists were strong

ly opposed to atomization, they took up the sc1entific approach
enthusiastically.1

As we shall see, they comb1ned the sc1entific

approach with that of the phenomenological method in their experi
ments on sensations.
In this ohapter, then we w111 f1rst of all study the application of the phenomenolog1cal method to Gestalt psychology of
perception.
menon.

w'e will then analyze the data given us in the pheno-

Finally. we will note briefly the other two areas in-

volved in each perception, namely, the geographical and physiological env1ronments.

And we will, beSides, take note of the

causal relationship each environment has with the other.

'l'he

lWolfgang KAhler, Phl,lqal Gestaltsa (Erlangen, 1920), pp.
as summarlzed in Willis D. Ellls, ~ §ource ~ ~
talt PSYOhology (New York, 193~~, p. 17.
ix-x~ll

06,-
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experIments and examples used here mostly ooncern v1sual peroeption rather than that of any of the other senses.

'Ihis approach

was chosen follOW1ng the precedent of the Gestaltlsts themselves
the great majority of whose experiments deal with vlsual peroeption.

However. what is sald of visual peroeption can be applIed

to the perceptlon of any of the other senses slnoe the prInciples
lnvolved are the same.
W1th the advent of the sclentlfl0 approach in all branches
of learnlng at the end of the nineteenth century men began to
demand:

"Give us facts only.

generallzatlons of times past.

Away with the vague philosophlcal
The purpose of sclence 1s to give

All generalizations on those facts and relations
between them are useless and tautologlcal.- 2 In opposition to
t@2tl~.

this narrow outlook several systems arose demanding emphasis on
subjective evaluation to go along with the "facts.·'

Among the

latter were the Gestalt theorists, who sald that mere facts are
2WOlfgang Kohler, The Flage of Val!,!• ..m !! WorJA .2.t Facts
(New York, 1938), pp. 35-36. (Hereafter this book will be referred to slmply as: Val~ jn World Q! Paots.); C. F. Kurt Koffk ,
l'!l!. Er;aoi.Qleg .Qt Gestalt PSYChologX (London, 1935), pp. 4-5
(Heres ter referred to s1mply as: ~ pr\no\ples • • • ). The
logical positivists are perhaps the most modern exponents of the
oonoept of soienoe as purely taotual. Confer esp. Richard von
Mlses, Pos\tiv\sm, .A StudX 1!l duman up4erstan4\ng, (Cambridge,
1951), pp. 80-90.
'JOhn Dewey's "Theory of Valuation • International Encyclo4, is probably
the leading souroe in the valuation movement.

.Qed~a ~ qn,fl!d S96eQO, {Chicago, 1939>, II, p.
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uselesa lf there 1s no theory to go along w1th them.
posslble ever to attain facts

~

It is 1m-

because they are alwa,. colore

with our subjective understandtng of thea.

It is only ln the

disoovery ot the relationshlps between faots and their causal
oonnections w1th each other that we atta1n to true sclentIflc
research. 4 The emphasls was shlftlng trom the mere fact to the
subJect1ve concept we have of the fact.

In giving a naIve and

aoou.rate acoount of these subJeot1"'. data, the Gestaltists felt
that they were coming as olose to the reallty ot thlngs as it
was p08s1ble tor the human mtnd.

Atter all, they reasoned, we

are only certatn of our dlreot internal experi.noe. S
no dlreot acceas to the phTaloal world,· a• ys K~.r.
,i

-Man bas
"The ph_no

.anal world oontalns all the materlal whIch 1. dlrectly g1... en
hllD.· 6

Theretore, 1t the Gestalt psychologIsts were to prove

that realIty exIsts as a wbole, the beat way to start i8 to inspect our subJeotive picture, our dIrect exper1ence.
It 18 pr1marily for thls reason that the Gestalt psyOhologlsts put

80

psyohology.

much .aphasis on the phenomenolog1oal approaCh In
For thelll it 18 neoessary to g1ve a s'tra1..;;httorward,

desor1pt1...e acoount ot conso1ousness; the phenomenon is supposed
to -speak tor ltaelt,· as 1t were.?

A8 Kottke 8ays:

-For us

4Kottka, ll!!. prinC1ples • • • , pp. 14 and 20.
S~., p. 6S. KAhler here 1s be1ng quoted by Koffka.
6 •

Kohler,

V,~~!

?Dav~d i§t"

In

World

otst!lt

~ ~2otl,

p. 14).

(New York, 19S0)

p. 18.

2)

phenomenology means as na1ve and

f~ll

a description of the di-

rect e~perlence as Possible.· 8

Many errors are ferreted out

when the subJect1ve d.ata are

thoroughly scrutinized as it

is with this method.

Many

80

times theorles are wrong or contain

some error because of undue hs.ste on the part of the one making
the Judgment.

OUr perceptions themselves are often at fault
wlthout our knOWing it. 9 For these reasons, the Gestalt sohool

found it necessary to apply phenomenology to every aspect of
its psyChology.

We w111

see It applied in the peroeption of

oausal relations in the theory ot isomorphism. but this is only

.s

part of 1ts Boope in Gestalt psyOhological theory.
so far

•
Kohler
goe8

to say.

-Phenomenology 18 the fleld. in whloh 811 con....
cepts f1nd their final Justlfioation. alO Katz adds that the
oomprehension of oontemporary psychology -necessitates an understanding of the phenomenological method. nll Finall,. it is expected that the proper applioation of this methodological sOienoe
wl11 answer one of the maln problema facing the Gestaltlst8 at
the present t1me, that of .the ultimate prlnc1ples underlylng

8 KO t'tka •

.!!:! Prin01ples • • • ,

p. 1").

9Kata • p. 18. Katz d1scusses here what the Gestalt1sts
oall the -stlmulus error,· a matter often brought up by them 1n
oonneotlon w1th percept1on. It 1s defined a81 ft • • • that whlch
makes us attribute to a th1ng ~.e. a peroept1ow elements whlch
should not be in it. It

10K~hler.

vaAU!

11 Katz , p. 18.

!Q WQ£14 ~ Ficts, p. 102.
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their theor1es.

12

Let us now take an example of a peroeptlon ln whlch the
phenomenologlcal method 1s

us~d.

Later we will verlfy our pheno-

menological data by means of experiments.
Let the reader lmaglne that he ls seated at his desk.

'lhere

are several art101es before hlm. for example, a typewr1ter, a.n
1nkwell, Bome booka, and a penol1.
obout 1n 80me

di8~er.

Thea. art10les are strewn

We examine thls peroept, asklng our-

selves how the objects 1n front ot us appear.

Do we have the

impress10n that all in tront of us forms one large object?

Do

we have the 1-'pres8ion that there is a group of stimuli spread
out in front of us at random with no unity at al11

No, the 1m-

presslon we get 18 nothing like the ones mentioned above.

Ex-

am1ning Buoh a peroept we tlndthat we attribute an independent
entlty to oerta1n stimuli or groups of st1muli; we div1de ott

.

the tield ot percept10n into parts,

1t were.

8S

ls one ent1ty, the 1nkwell another, and
thls?

80

forth.

'llhe

typewrlter

Why do we do

The layman m1ght conslder th1s last questlon superfluous,

ln fact, s111y.

Aotually the questlon 1. an lmportant one, es-

pecially to the modern psyohologist.

For, wha.t reason can the

atom1st give for the phenomenon we have of certa1n def1nite in-

12K~hl.r. Value ~ world 2! Facta, v1l. He says: "neYer,
I belleve, shall we be able to Bolve any problems of ult1mate
prinoiple until we go back to the souroe. of our concepts, __
ln other words, until we use the phenomenologioal method •.•• -
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dependent entltles, dlvided off as they are from others?lJ

It

reallty ls nothlng but the reoeptlon of dlsparate stlmull, why
the separate entities?14
The problem oan be restated in another way.

Why ls lt that

the plle of books appears to the observer as a collectlon ot
separatt thing.?

Slnoe the typewriter partlally obsoures the

lnkwell, Why are theae objeots not seen as one unlt'?

'l'he atomlst

might answer that we see these objects as separate ent1tles slmply beoause we have had prevlous experlence ot them as suoh.
Thus we are able to reoogn1ze them even lt some of the1r dimenslons are obsoured by other obJectse

In answer to this the 08 ....

staltlsts reply that experience, whlle lmportant ln peroeption,
by no means plays the major role in the formatlon of objeots lnto
separate beings.

For thequestlon still remalns, how dld we

form the very flrst ooncept of this object whioh we now see a.
a un1t?

Gestalt psychology holds that the tendency to form ob-

l)The Gestalt concepts of the -total vlsual fleld" as opposed to the ·natural subdlvislons- of that field oome lnto play
here. The distlnctlon between the ,two 1s an lmportant one. We
do not deny that the aestaltlsts hold that every percept 1s a
whole 1n a senle. Thls whole plcture of the given ls called by
them the 'total visual fleld.- However, they do not deny that
1n each -total visual fleld· we dlvlde off certain obJeots as
independent entitles 1n themselves. These subdivislons are slmply called by the Oes,altlsts -natural subdlvislons· ln the -total
vlsual fleld.' See Kohler, ·Some Gestalt Problems," as summar1zed
ln ElliS, A SourO! ~ .2.t Clt'£llt PIYQAOlOiY, pp. 56-5114
Katz, pp. 20-21. Nearly all of the .torego1ng phenomenolog1cal analysi8 18 oonta1ned 1n this sectlon of Katz.
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Jects as wholes becomes operative in the consciousness of a child
from the start, even without experience of any sort.1S

This is

equally true of a person born bllnd.
One method of verlflcation to support this viewpo1nt can
be found 1n the comprehenslon of prevlously unknown objects.

In

this, ·we often comprehend objects as units before we have any
way of knOWing what they are 11ke.

'l'his applies to vlslon in

comparative darkness.

It occurs in strange surroundings when
we come upon obJeots we have never before seen," 16 We even have
the tendency to oonstruct wholes when they are not completely
g1ven as sUCh. l ?
All the forego1ng d1scussion has proven one thing, according to Gestalt psyohology, namely, that by the use of the phen-

l5 Ib1d ., p. 22. See also Kurt Koffka, In! Growtb ~!ba
Mind (New York, 1931), pp. 352-362. In this very analytic treatment of the first ooncepts of the Child Koffka says: "If the
question is asked how the first perception of thing arises in
the child, we may answer negatively that it would be wrong to
suppose that the 'thing' is nothing but a mere connection of
various visual, gustatory, and auditory attributes resulting
from frequent repetition.

. . .• .li]he
. . world
. . . as. . it. appears
., . . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
to the infant is already formed.·

pp.352 and 354.
16Katz, p. 22.
l?We flnd .hls statement verif1ed by Gestalt's 1mportant
Pr1nc1ple of pregnanz. Thls .rl"~.nc1ple states that: ·Psyohologlcal organizatlon will always be as good as the controlling c1rcumstances perm1t." It is the subJeot of mabJ Gestalt experlments. For further lnformation see Koftke, Ill!. pr1nc1ples . . . .
p. 110. We will study the Pregnanoy Princ1ple more thoroughly
in Chapter 4 of this thes1s.
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omenologloal method we find that peroept1on 1s ho11st1c and not
an "and-summat1on w18 of sanse elements.

It 1s 1mposslble for

the meohanist1c theory to explain these phenomenological facts.
If perceptlon 1s a mere recept10n by the organism of unrelated
stimu11. why do we find separate 1ndependent entlt1es in our
phenomenologlcal analysis?

'l'he ordinary mechan1st1c answer to

th1s query 1s that there is some f1xed mechanloal devlce wh1ch
accounts for the organization of stimu11 1nto certain definite
groups or ent1tles.
true.

K~hler answers by say1ng that 1f this 1s

"It should follow that the mechan10ally f1xed elementary

regions and functional boundarles by which order 1s ach1eved
would somehow be detected ln phenomenal experlenoe.· 19
One mlght tend to think that thls not1on of totallty 1n
phenomenal peroeption 18 grossly over-emphasized by the Gestalt
sOhool.

The fact is, however, that the Gestaltists cons1der lt

a very 1mportant polnt supportlng thelr general theory of percept1on.

As K3hler says:

WIn my own op1nlon one oannot grasp

the positlon of the Gestalt theory until one has learned to
wonder about the fact of oonorete artioulatlons in the vlsual

18Th1s 1s the usual translation of Werthelmer's oft-repeated
und-verbls4ungen, a word meaning literally and-relations or
oonnectlons. By 1t he wish~s to signify the haphazard grouping
of sense elements, wlthout 1nterrelat1on and without organ1zation, to whloh the elementarlst sohool is oommitted in its theory
of sense perceptlon. See asp. Nax Wertheimer. "'l'he General
'lheoretioa1 S1tuation. It as summarized ln lUlls, pp. 12-16.
19K~hler, ·Some Gestalt problems,· as summarized in ElliS,

pp. 56-57-
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fleld. n20
After looking at the argument from the phenomenological
method, we will now inspect three empirical facts used to prove
that our perception gives us a unified totality.

However, since

this thes1s is mainly concerned with Gestalt theory, wowill
not stress the exper1mental data.
In Figure 121 we see a set of vertioa.l lines folloT.lied by
a group of dots in the same order.

'lhe lines olosest to each

other are seen in pa1rs or str1pes in between which are larger
spaoes.

The dots peroeived olosest to each other are grouped

into rows whioh a.re separated by larger spaoes again.

IJ:his s1mple

exper1ment examplifies the "law of proximity" of Gestalt, whlch
states.

"Other thlngs being equal, 1n a total stimuluB situa-

tion those elements which are closest to each other tend to torm
groups.·22

The inferenoe i8 obvious:

how explain this group-

ing of oertain stlmuli into oerta1n totals or independent ent1tles?

If,

, 8S

the atomlsts say, peroeptiOll is a mere stimulus-

response process, why do we find in the response something added
to the mere stimuli, namely, th'3 entitative grouping?
alt law of proxim1ty gives the answer.23

l'he Gest-

We w1ll see a further

20~·t
Th .....
p. 57·
215ee p. 29 of this thesis for FIGURE 1.

23 Katz, pp. 24-25; Koffka,

~

Pr1nc1ples • • • , pp. 164-167_

2'It should not be supposed that the laws of proximity.
sim11ari ty, etc. give any ult 1ma.te criterion of oneness. 'l'hey
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disoussion of other Gestalt laws in the fourth chapter of thls
thesis.
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FIGuRE 1
'I'.HE LAV; OJ' PBOXINI'l'Y

We will now take up Christian von Ehrenfels t two oriteria
of form.

These two experlments are important to Gestalt psy-

ohology not only beoause they were among the very first experiments performed and gave Gestalt psyohology its start. but also
beoause they are used as basl0 exper1ments 1n all Gestalt fields.
We will see them applied to the theory of lsomorphism ln Chapter
Ehrentels' flrst oriterion was simply applied.

~orking

on

different musioal melodies, he pOinted out that a tune cannot be
comprehended as a mere sum of its constituent notes, but it must
24
possess a h1gher quallty which he called the 8form quality."

have noth1ng to do w1th the metaphys1cal criteria of substance.
'l'hey are purely laws of the phenomenal world, and are meant to
be such by the Gestalt psychologists. A thorough study of the
physlo1ogical processes underlying perception 1s a neoessary part
of the Gestaltists' oomplete explanat1on.
24See Katz, p. 35, for much of what 1s said here concerning
the von Ehrenfels' exper1ment.

•
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In th1s eXperiment, a melody ls played to the subjects several
times until they beoome aoqua1nted with it.

Then, a while later,

the same melody is played in a dlfferent ke.y.

It ls only the

trained mus1cian who pan piok out t.hat there is a.ny difference
between the flrst aud the seoond playin,g of the melody-even
though they are played in totally different keys.
the physical stimuli are not the

sa~e

Now, obviously

in these two oases.

L~oked

at from lts phys10al aspeot. as the behavior1sts do, the frequeno
of the wave lengths of the notes of the two melodies is oompletel
different.

'I'he one played in a lower !-:ey is oomposed of waves

of a lower frequenoy_

Therefore, the phys1cal stimulus is not

the same 1n the two exper1ments.
same sensation.

~h.y

do not notioe a change when the keys of

the two pieoes are ohanged.
havloristio grounds.

Yet, the subjeotc report the

rl'h1s reaot ion ls untenable on be-

The behavlorists hold that for every stim-

ulus there 1s a oorrespond1ng response. 25

This stimulus-response

relatlonship 113 supposed to follow with mechanioal oonsistenoy
and aoouraoy.

'Jlhe followers of

~Jatson

supposedly verlfy this

theory by showing that wlth d1fferent st1mul1 you get a d1fferent
response.

For 1nstanoe, the stlmulus could be a stlok of candy

dangling in front of a baby; the 'response 1s the baby's taking
the oandy.

The only answer that oan be given by thew. to the

25woodworth, pp. 80-81. For the Gestalt vlewp01nt see also
Bruno Petermann, I.tu! gestalt :l'heory and !.h!. troblem of Conr1gura-

~

(London, 1932), pp. 21 and 25.

von Ehrenfels' experiment 1s that there is some quality in both
sets of responses which is the same.

I].'he Gestaltists agree.

This quality von Ehrenfels called the form-quality or the
quallt:t. 1I26

~estalt

The second crIter10n of von Ehrenfels is that of transposabl1lty.

The IndIVidual elements of the organ1zed structure can

be sh1fted but the relat10n between the parts remains the same,.
A melody, for 1nstance, can be played in a totally different key
but the parts of the new melody so arrange themselves that the
same relat10nship between them remaIns, the form-qualIty rema1ns
the same.

'l'he argument whIch we pres.anted for the first criter-

ion can be applIed for the second.
These experIments, wh11e concerned with dIfferent aspects
of a subjectIve phenomenon, definItely have one thIng In common.
The stimulI In each case are varied in different ways and yet
the same holistIc sensation rema1ns.
The next experiment that we will take to show, agaIn, the
structural nature of our percept is that of Wertheimer's phiphenomenon~7

In this fam1liar exper1ment the subj~ct sees what

26woodworth" pp. 12.5-126.
27WIth tilia experiment we get Into the field of exper1mentat10n 1n ambiguous figures &nd illusions t11at the Gestalt psychologists are so interested In. These eXper1ments were a knotty
problem for the older psychology to explain because of its necessary oommitment to the atomistio explanation. fl'he Geetal t theorists seem to have an argument when they say that such illusory
phenomena can only be explained from the holistic viewpoint.

3z
appears to be an objeot in motion whereas in reality there is
no movement present.

lJ:'wo

visual elements (pictures, neon lights,

etc.) located in near proximity to eaoh other are flashed
oeesively in front of the observer.

~he

8UC-

result, as it seems to

the observer, 1s that there is only one obJeot, and that objeot
is in motion. 28

~i,lhe inference of the experiment is obvious.

'I'he physical stimu11 are plural and they are statio.
tion 1s of a single objeot in motion.

fIhe sensa-

If, as the behaviorists

say, to every stimulus there 1s a oorresponding and adequate response and that this process takes place w1th absolute mechanical
preoision, then how explain the above described sensation?

In

the experiment the stimuli are varied in every way and yet the
same holistiO sensation is recorded.
We have seen only a small portion of the experiments the
Gestaltists oonduct in the field of perception.

However they

all tend to show the same results, namely, as Katz says: "that
all objeots appear as olosed units originally, without experienoe.- 29

These experiments, While having as their direct pur-

pose to prove the Gestalt theSis, also oast very ser10us reflect10ns on the basic tenets of the behavior1st and associationlst
theories.
Someone might obJeot that the experimentations on ambiguous

28Katz , p. 34 g1ves a good acoount of the phi-phenomenon.
29 Ka t z, p. 2":1
~..I.
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and illusory figures have no validity because the stimuli used
are such as to "deoeive" the sense faculties.

It is true that

In such experiments the subject is -deceived" as to what 1s really happen1ng in the objective stimuli outslde.

JO

~~e

saw in wer-

theimer's experiment that there are many static stimuli so Juxtaposed and flashed in front of the observer that he thinks he sees
only one moving object.

'1'he Gestalt1sts admit that there 1s a

-decept10n" 1n th1s matter.

But the particular

expe~1ments

we

are conoerned with now are not meant to prove anyth1ng about the
real order.

They are meant to show that our sense percepts are

so made that they tend to form concrete artIculations of pheno.
mena, they "want", as It were to see things as a tota11ty.
laws of the mind demand this.

The

The ooncern here is with the pheno

menal order and the laws governing that order.

We will see later

how the Gestalt psychologists incorporate their theory of reality
with their perceptual theories.

31

By now it should be clear to the reader that 'the Gestalt
pioture of peroeptionis not just divergent from the atomistic
picture predominant at the end of the n1neteenth oentury.

I'he

30 we will not here go into the quest10n whether 1t 1e the

senses that are deoe1ved, a,s the Gestalt psyoholog1sts hold. or
whether 1t 1s a wrong Judgment on the part of the subJeot which
1s necessarily for error.
31~~e will not deal with the application of the Gestalt Conoept of form as app11ed to the real order until the next chapter,
wh1ch conoerns the perceptual theory of isomorph1sm.. '1.n.-td'!':t:J;1S-ohapter we w1sh to show only that the phenomenal or
tured.

~
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Gestalt p1cture 1s diametrically opposed to it.
the oppos1te view to that of atomism.

It gives just

For the old psyChology

held that percept10n 1s an and-summat10n of 1nd1v1dual 1solated
sensat1ons, a piecemeal aggregate of st1mull, as Wertheimer calle
1t.J2
In their ~he meOhanists; alm to get at the elements of
th1nking they cut to pleces living thlnking processes, deal
with them bllnd to structure, assuming that the process 1s
an aggregate, a sum of those elements. In dealing with
prooesses of our type they can do nothlng but dlssect them,
and thus~jhow a dead picture stripped of all that is alive
in them.""')
Percept1ons, say the oppOSition, are formed as a house is built-.
briok by brick.

The ind1vidual receives sense impressions from

many d1fferent stlmulat10ft$i he bu11ds-yp the d1sparate stimuli
into a meaningful peroept somehow or other.

For 1nstance, 11ght

waves hitting the retina in several dlfferent places at d1fferent
frequenc1es, etc., leave d1fferent stimul1 1n var10us loca11t1es.
The observer might receive such d1fferent v1sual sensat1ons, then
as Rred,· -green,· "blue."

He m1ght have the auditory sensat10n

of the sound of a tra1n whistle golng from a higher to a lower
p1tch.

He m1ght have the tactual sensat10n of a strong breeze

aga1nst h1m and a rumb11ng underneath his feet.

The sum of these

sensat10ns 1s peroeived by the observer as that of a train with
various colored cars go1ngby at a fast rate.

'l'he observer bull t

32 Max vJerthelmer, Proquctiye ThlnklDl( (New York, 1945), p.

192; Wolfgang K!hler, Gestalt PsyOhology
ff. ; petermann, p. 45.

33 w r

New York, 1920), p. 280

J5
up the unrelated group of sensations, aa it were, until they became a unified slngle 1mpresslon.

~[,his

is oalled a. process of

sensatlon "from down-up"; that ls, from many d1sparate elements
one sensat10n results. J4 But how the 1ndiv1dual 1s able to get
such a unif1ed sensat1on; why he chooses some stimu11 and not
others; and what laws govern his aotions throughout the peroept10n are questions wh10h do not seem adequately answered ,by the
DJechan1Bta.
The Gestalt psycholog1st, on the other hand, say that the
sensation follows an oppos1te oourse.

rIhe subJeot f1rst of all

has the percept of a total structure.

Iie understands the peroept

in that light.
t~a1n

When he sees, for 1nstance, a variously oolored

1n mot1on, he does not th1nk he is first seeing:

"red,"

"green," "blue"; fee11ng: "breeze,· "rumb11ng underneath feet,·
~ct.

He th1nks of the obJeot as ·somethlng" whloh 1s oolored,

mov1ng, etc.

By analys1s he 1s able to break-down th1s whole

peroept lnto 1ts stlmulus elements.

The Gestalt process 1s "from

up-downward,· not v1ce versa. J5
Sc1ent1f10 analysls, then, 1s not against the Gestalt tenets.
But the parts are only known after we exper1ence the sensat10n
as a whole, not before.

After the sensation 1s formed, it 1s

analyzed to d1scover 1ts different elements.,6
)4El11s , p. 15; Petermann, 26; Woodworth, pp. 121-122.

JoS El11 .,
,6,

p. 15.

ve otten been cr1tio1zed for abandonl

So far we have oovered two maln polnts ln our treatment of
percept10n aocording to

r~stalt

psyohology.

Flrst of all we saw

that the phenomenologlcal method reveals whole structures ln per~e

ceptlon.
ments.

then further verlfied this with three famous experl-

We w111 now analyze the process of perception itself lnto

its various parts to discover the main steps lnvolved ln the type
oal hollstic sensat1on.

In this analysls we agaln follow the

Gestalt method; we break-down the process of sensatlon into its
llarts.
Ject.

~ve

14111 flrst take the object of sensation, then the sub-

'l'hen we will see how the latter ls further a.nalyzed into

1ts component psyohophysloal elements.
Almost all phl1osophloal systems admlt that in every peroept10n there 1s a subject-objeot relatlonshlp.

'Ihe sensatlon start

with somethlng Aoutside,· 1t 1s sald, and thls obJeotive element
affeots the subject ln Bome way; there ls a relat10nshlp of actio
passlo.

Whether thls obJeot ls really dlstlnot from the subjeot

peroe1vlng or not ls a matter ot oontentlon among the dlfferent
systems.

The fact ls that there 1s a subject-object relatlonshlp

of some sort.

The Gestaltlsts also hold to such a rea1tlonshlp.

They oall the obJeotlve,·externa1 stlmulus the "geographioal

the analytio method, that method whioh has proven so productive both in solenoe and psyohology al1ke. Qest~lt psychology
denles that lt has done thls. It states tr~t analYSis ls tlne
ln lts proper place~ 1.e. J after sensations are formed. Accordln
to Katz, (p. 16,) RLTJhere ls no need to abandon the analytio
method employed by the older psychology 1n its study of perceptlon. The method remains valuable even lf many of its findlngs
should be regarded ln a new ilght because of Gestsl t theory.1f
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environment •• 37

'lihis environment is where the sensatIon begins,

or, more exactly, whence the sensation begins.

It is the phy-

sloal world around us and it follows the laws of the physical
world. physics.

W1thin th1s geographical env1ronment itself

the Gestalt psyChologists distingu1sh two types of being or,
referring to perception, stimuli.

'I'he two stimuli are: the "dis-

tant" stimulus, and the "proximate" stimulus.

The distant stimu-

lus is the stimulus as it arrives at our sense organs after It
has been affected by the medIa. 37a We will see more of these
terms in a later chapter.
The oausal OQRP'9tion38between the object, the geographical
environment, and the subJeot is important for Gestalt.

Aocording

to these psyChologists this environment has a d1rect causality
on the subJeot experienolng.J9

It 1s this causal action of the

geograph1cal environment whioh explains, according to the Qestaltlsts, the existence of the sensat1on.
Here we see another exam;>l. of Gestalt as a react10nary

J7Koffka. l'h. PrinciRles • • • , pp. 27-28. 'I'he word "environment" lla.eans for the Gestaltist: " • • • a definite number
of separate objects and events, which, as separate objects and
events, are produots of organizat1on.- Ib1d., p. 67. It 1s a
comb1nation of all the c1roumstanoes affeoting sensat1on.
378xoffka, The Prlnoiijle,. • • , pp. 78-80.
'Seaus. for the Gestaltist means pretty muoh the same as
it does for the soholastio. Koftka. (The pr!nolples. • • t p.
378) describes it as the "1mparting" of foroe or movement from
one body to another.
39KOfrka, The Prlno.ples • • • , pp. 62, 75. 79.
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sohool.

For it rejeots Humets ideas on causa11ty entirely.

Most,

if not all, of the other modern schools of psyChology accept the
Humean denial of oausality.

affirm with him that causality
40
is a mere temporal sequence of events.
A. M1chotte has reoently
~hey

oonducted experimental work in the field of oausality proving
the Gestalt thesis on this subjeot, namely, that causality can
be perceived in sensation.

41

Applying the phenomenological method

to exper1mental perceptual Situations, he oonoludes that the experienoe of oausality is a primary phenomenon.
Kurt Koffka, one ot the leading Gestalt theorists, summarizes the Gestalt position on oausality as follows:
But s1noe Hume we have been taught that the naive person is
mistaken ~n thinking that he sees the process of causation1; that he could not possibly .i!.! such transferenoe of
motion or foroe, beoause 1n the stimulat1ng conditions, in
the light waves, there is nothing that oould produoe suoh:a
peroept10n • • • It ~ume's position] is one of the oornerstones of the positivistio attitude towards solence Which
we have had so many occasions to attaok. But its strel~th
and uaassallabllity • • .are only apparent.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Must we not say instead thet as some spatial stimulus distrIbutions produce varlous shapes. and some spatio-temporal
ones the experience of motion, so ~i11 others arouse the
perceptlon of force and causatlon?~2

And again:
A causal conneotion is not a mere faotual sequence to be
memorized like the oonnection between a name and a tele40

See Chapter I of th1s thesis.

41A•

M~ohott~. ~ Peroeption ~ ~ Causalite (Louvaln, 1946)

42Koffka. The PrinolRles. • • • pp. 378-379 and 38;.
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phone number, but 1s intelligible. 4J
The next step in our analysis of perception takes us within
the subjeot himself.

It Is the mediatlng step between the geo-

graphical environment and the finished perception. I~e will call
44
it the phys1ological environment.
It is this physiological environment Whioh, as we Satl, is in dIrect causal conneotion with
the geographioal.
proc.,ss.,4.5

The physiological envlronment is an unconscious

It is a. oombination of the physlo1ogical processes

which enter 1nto the formatIon of the peroept and mediate between
the geographical environment and the final consoious or perfected
sensation.

It is mainly the offioe of medIator, however, that
the physiological environment fulfills. 46 In its capacity as mediator it aots according to definite rules whiOh we will discuss
in the fourth chapter.

Here. we will simply pOint out the exIst-

ence of this second step in perception.

In regard to this environ·

4).IlU!! •• 20

44The Oestaltists use the terms "physioal processes," ·physical organism," "real organism," etc. to refer to that part of
sensation in whioh the body 1s involved.. It is the part of the
sensatIon between the external sense organ and the aotual oonsOlousness. For matters of slmp11f1oation and clarity, however,
we will refer to thls as the physiological environment. '1'he word
-behaVioral- or phenomenal," then, refers to the psychic eIlv1ronment, the word geograph1cal to the extra-organismal env1ronment,
and the word physiological to the 1ntermediate, nervous system.
4.5Koftka, ~ Pr1nclp~ee • • • t pp. 53. 62-63; K~hler, "Some
Gestalt Problems. tt as summar1zed by ElliS, p. 60.

46 Ib1d ., p. 61. Koffka says: "Between these two worlds,
1.e. th~havloral and geographical, and mediating between them
are the physiologioal processes within the organism.-

40
ft

ment Koffka quotes Kohler as follows:

- • • • there is no reason

at all why oonstruot1on of phys1010g1cal processes directly underlying experienoe should be impossible, 1f exper1ence allows us
the construction of a physical world outside which is related to
it much less int1mately."47
When the Gestalt psycholog1sts speak of the "dynamio unify1ng activ1ty of the subjeot" 1n the sensat10n, they are referr1ng
ma1nly to the work1ng of th1s phys10logioal env1ronment.
plays a very dynamio role 1n the process of sensat10n. 48

For it
Th1s

env1ronment works unoonsOiously on the senae data and gives 1t
subjective articulation and organization.

.Katz adds to this:

Two variet1es of factors constantly determine the course
of physical processes. In the first oategory are forces
at work in the prooess itself; they represent its dynamiC
aspeot. In the second category are those Characteristics
of the systems concerned whiCh may be regarded as c~~stant
oondit1ons for the particular process tak1ng place.
Spontaneous self-structur1ng occurs in a P~~OhophYS10al
field Just as it does in a phys1cal f1eld.
The physiologioal explanation behind the pregnanoy La.w shows

the underlying dynam10 aotiv1ty ot the organism during the formation of a percept.

'llheretore, sinoe this notion of dynamio aoti-

47llU4. t 6 2.
48K!hler, "Some Gestalt Problems,· as summarized by El11s,
pp. 61-64; Petermann, p. 113. Here Petermann gives a oritioism
of th1s reasoning.
49Katz, p • .52.

SO~.,

p. 49.
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vity 1s so important to the Gestaltists and since we are now discuss1ng the physiolog1cal environment, we will go into the matter
a b1t further.

We saw above that the law of pregnanoy states that

our psyOhological organization must be "as good as the controlling
circumstances permit. uS1 In this form the law seems anything but
def1nite.

However, Katz clears up some of the obscurity by ex-

plaining:

UIt should be emphas1zed that 'good' refers to such

character1stics as regularity, symmetry, inclusiveness, unity,
harmony, maximal simplicity and conciseness."5 2

A

good example

of the workings of the pregnancy law can be seen 1n the example
of the c1rcle w1th a small gap 1n its c1roumference..

The observer

tends to see this figure as perfectly symmetr1cal even though 1t
aotually 1s not. S'
1n th1s way.

During the formation of the peroept, the Whole ner-

systems undergoes adjustment to the new stimulus situation.

~ous

~he

Now physiologioally we can explain this law

full explanation of this neural activity is a. very complioated

pne; therefore it would
owing ohapter.

be best to take it oompletely in the fol-

In this chapter we will just take note of certa1n

)vert bodily reactions such as those we come upon in every day life
Sl~ •• p. 40.

52Ibid.
~ept.

5'The law of pragn:mz i8 very important to the Gestalt conKatz says (p. 40): ftGestalt psyohology considers the preg-

conoept to be of the greatest Significance. It is universal.
t operates in every individual regardless of experience. In more
pecif1c terms 1t means that the organism has a tendency toward.
ertaiutmodes of behav1or, whether they are perceptions, movements,
)r attl udes.·

~nce

42

The aotivity of the lens of the human eye is a good example from
every

day

experlence.

By expand1ng and oontracting this visual

meohanism can be seen to adjust itself to l1ght intensity so that
the clearest possible image falls on the ret1na.

Or, if one is

dealing with an auditory sensat1on, the head adjusts itself toward
the souroe of sound for better hearing.
Another good exper1mental indication of dYnbmio activity
in the physiolog1cal environment is found in the body's reaotion
to ambiguous figures.

In such figures either one of two images

can be seen by the observer.

Take the familiar example in which

one oan see either a chalioe in white against a black background
or two profiles in black faCing each other and silhouetted against
a white ground.

Both images cannot be seen simultaneously.

In

this case, lf the subject looks a.t the figure long enough, he will
notice that his peroept ohanges back and forth from one image to
the other.

'l'he subJeot does not cboose which flgure will occupy

h1s attent10n at anyone time.

The attention on one figure rather

than another is Simply a spontaneous operation. 54 The obvious oonclus10n is that if there were no dynamic aotivity golng on, there
would be no shiftlng of percepts.

~I.'hese

and other experient1al

phenomena show that the physical processes are not static to the
reception of stimulus in perception, but dynamio.
We now come to the final step in sensation.
Gestalt theory this is the behaVioral environment.

54

Katz.

1:>'
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According to
It is the point

1n peroeption where consciousness begins.

Koffka makes this olear

when he says:
If we are forced to introduce the oonoept of oonsciousness,
we have to accept it, whether we l1ke 1t or not. But it 1s
1mportant to note that the word oonsciousness does not chang4
the mean1pg of our own term behavioural environment. If
anyone wants to s~ak of the animal's consciousness instead,
he must apply th1s wor~cto those objects whioh we call behavioural environment. ~
The behaVioral enVIronment, then, 1s the subject1ve aspect of
rea11ty as opposed to the objeotive aspect presented by the geographical and physiolog1cal env1ronments respectively.56

But both

of the latter two env1ronments are 1nferior or subord1nate to the
behavioral in the eyes of the Gestalt1sts.

According to

them

the

behavioral env1ronment 1s the -higher mental process," the realm
of mind. S7

Koftka remarks:

Look1ng at the soiences of Nature, Life, and Mind, we may
extraot from eaoh one spec1fic and particularly important
concept, ViZ., from the f1rst: quantity, from the second:
order, and from the third: meaning or signif1cance (in
German: ~) 1'8 Our psychology _ then must have place for
all of these.,;;}
Thus consciousness or the behavioral env1ronment is the result
of the structuring process that went on unoonsc1ously in the phySSKoffka. The prtqcipleg_ • • , p.

3S.

S6lR1d ., p. 33: M• • • we see that our difference between
the geograph1cal and behav10ral env1ronment coincides with the d1f.
ference between things as they 'really' are and things as they 1001
to us, between reality and appearanoe."

S7Ibld., p. 25; K~hler, "Some Gestalt problems," as summarized 1n ElliS, p. 60.
S8 Ko ffka, The prinoiples • • • f p. 25; See also K~hler. "8om~
"P'l"nh1 AmA- rl:U; lImmmA'l"" '7. Ad \ nEl] i g
n
60

04Ult.A 1 t
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siolog1cal environment. 59

It 1s this finished product of per-

oeption that 1s the object of phenomenological research. 60
The Gestalt1sts make an important d1st1nction between the
eaysality exerted by the geographical env1ronment upon the physiological and the relation between the physiological environment
and the behavioral.

In the former there 1s a d1rect causal con-

nect10n t as we saw.

In the latter there

~~.

Kottke int1mate.

this in two or three statements he makes about the relat1onsh1p
between the two f1elds:

-True enough, this conscious s1de ot the

processes does not enter into our causal explanations, but it has
to be recognized as a faot nevertheless."

He oont1nues:

"And

that leads to the conclusion that it is of the warp and woot ot
certain events that they 'reveal themselves," that they are accompanied by conso1ousness.· 61
The physiological env1ronment, then. is the necessary concomitant,
the oondltio

~ ~~,

of the behavioral enVironment.

It is

not the direot oause of the behavio.ral environment.
To. summarize, then, the Gestalt pioture of peroeption delineated 80 far, we see a thorough system progress1ng trom the
phenomena of direot experience to phenomenologioal analysis and,
flnally, verifioat10n of the phenomenal data by experimentation.

59See p. 40, note 45 of this thesiS.
60Korrka, The Princlple~ • • •

-

61 Ib1d ., p. 65.

t

See also p. 47.

p. 73.

The result of this phenomenological research and experimentation
1s a well supported proof of the Gestalt theory of phenomenal perception:

-that all objects appear as closed units or1gInally,

!WIthout experlenoe.· 62
The prooess of gett1ng the peroept is analyzed by the Qestaltists into three distinot steps called environments:

the ob-

jeotive rea11ty of the outside world whIch has a direot oausal
effect on the subjeot. called the geograph1cal enVIronment; the
phys1ological prooesses of the subject·s organism, oalled the
physiological environment; and the phenomenal \,/orld of immedIate
ponsolousness, wh10h is not causally related to the other environoalled the behavioral environment.

~ents,.

While, as we shall see, this system has its flaws, it cannot
De denied that 1t poses ser10us problems to any mechanistic or
atomistic system of psychology.

fl'o

the Gestaltlsts, the older

psyohology wlth 1ts atom1zed lndependent elements 1s statio and
~ooden,

totally 1noapable of be1ng a real sclenoe of man.

If atom-

at1c psyohology 1s to hold to any meaningfulness at all, say the
~stalt

psycholog1sts, it must come around to the admission of

.ome struoturllzation of the peroeptual f1eld.
ng • • •
~hat

As Katz says "Mean-

1s 1nternal form arrangement • • • 'llhe Gestalt view 1s

anyth1ng wh1ch 1s not a form, but whioh oan be thought of

s s1mply oonnected by 'and·, is devo1d of mean1ng.·6;

62 Katz , p. 23.
6)Ibld.

D.
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CHAPTER III
THE THEORY OF IS0MOBI'HIS11

fllhu.s far we have seen the Gestalt theory of perception as
it is phenomenologically ascertained and analyzed.

We

saw ttlB.t

in the phenomenal or behavioral sphere at least the Gestalt theory
of perception has been establ1shed, according to the Gestaltists,
by the phenomenological method.

The conclusion drawn by Gestalt

psyohology 1s that phenomenal data actu.ally presents itself to
our oonsciousness as struotured or Gestalted.
the complete picture of perception.

But this is not

The question still remains

as to how this struotured Whole of whioh we are consoious oame
about.

What of the other two environments mentioned?

also Gestalten?

Are they

If so, the Gestalt theory of perception can be

said to stand on firm ground; if not, the whole theory could be
rendered useless.

For it 1s true that the argumentation from the

phenomenological method is valid, but it is valid only in the
phenomenal or behaVioral order.

It is not valid for the other

two env1ronments entering into perception, namely, the geographical and the physiological.

1he question, then, is how to extend

the Gestalt concept as to include all the enVironmental factors
entering into perce.ption.

The answer to this question, say the

47
Gestaltlsts, is to be found in the theory of isomorphism.
Actually, the stomlsts forced the Oestaltlsts to initiate
their theory of isomorphism.

For a.tomistlc psychology never tires

of in8isting upon tne molecular aspeot of such sciences as physios
and biology.

According to them the whole world, both organic

and inorganic, 1s made up of minute sub-microsoopic ent1ties called molecules, atoms, electrons. etc.

In faot, Bay the atomists,

the more the physical sOlenoes develop, the more minute beoome
the entities which are supposed to oompose our real world.

Suoh

minute entitles are completely invisible to the eyes of man.

How

is it pOSSible, then, they ask, that we could see ·wholes" 1n
our perception?

The writings of many physical soientists and

theorists shoi'f that the atomistio psychologists had good. author1
ities behind them.
It wa.s obvious to the Gestalt psyCholog1sts that the1r theory
of

perce~tion

could never be establ1shed until suah object1ons

as those above were answered.

Henoe, they set about apply1ng the

"structura.l whole" concept to the geogra.phlcal and physiological
env1ronments.

For these two environments are both 1n the realm

of the phys10al s01enoes.
To

a~preclate

the value of 1somorphism, then, we will use

the following method. of exposition.

~4e

will first get a brief

OOl1spectus of the theory as a. whole from one of the leading oon-

lK~hlerJ Value in the World

In!

prinoiples • • •

:-p:-6

.Q! Facts, pp. 169 ff; Koffka,
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temporary exponents of Gestalt psychology.

After this we will

see the theory in its historical setting, going back to the theory's first beginnings.

It
Kohler's
syatematlc appl1cation of the

Gestalt conoept to the geographical environment will then be

ShOWl.

Flnally we w11l see how the Gestalt1ats applled th1s aame ooncept
to the physlo1oglcal enV1ronment.

In following th1s procedure

we are actually studylng the theory of lsomorphlsm as it was genetically developed by the Gestaltlsts themselves.

A general conspectus of the theory of isomorphlsm oould be
stated as follows.

The theory atat.s that not only are our sub-

Jective percepts organlzed wholes, but the physlcal reallty out.
sid.e of us which causea these percepts is also a structured whole.
Besld.ea thls, the physiologlcal envlronment underlying the subJectlve peroept ls hol1stlc.
envlronments.

There is a llke form

2

ln all three

Katz states the theory 1n general as follows:

-The theory ot physioal torms malntains that there are torm-llke
hollstic systesa ln 1norganio nature Just as there are 1n biolog1cal organisms.'

And later on he says:

essenoe of lsomorphism is that phenomenologically asoertained forms aotually correspond to psyohophys1cal forms.
Psyohophysioal forms in the braln are viewed as not essent1
ally dlfferent from the physical forms of inorganlc nature. 4

~he

The implications ot this theory are obVious.

words

2 The wor4 -lsomorphism" comes, ot cours"
~

If once proven, lt

trom the two Greek
meaning equal or same, and morphe meaning form.

'Katz, p • .54.
4'Ib_~d •• p. 55
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would great11 undermine atomistic p,syOhology and help to establish Gestalt theory as the baaia for muoh ot exper1mental payanology.

But now to the history ot thia Gestalt theory.

The theory ot isomorphism really had its beg1nn1ngs among
the physiOists ot the n1neteenth oentury.

It was J. Clerk Max-

well who 1ntroduoed the tield concept into phys1os.

Maxwell be-

gan exper1ments with eleotrio and electro-magnetio fieldS, oon-

sidering as he did pull and pressure as torces applied direotly
trom one point to the next."

This field theory in phYSiCS was

enhanced further in the twentieth oentury by Einsteln's ohanges
ln Newton's theory of gravitation.

Einstein postulated a field

of foroes ln whioh eaoh force had a relation of interdependenoe
with the others.

Hewton's old theory of foroes aoting at a 4i8.,6

tanoe was beoom.ing solentifioally passe.

Thla beginning ot a fleld theory in the physical sclenoes
proved a valuable asset to th.e Gestalt theorists looking for a
rapproohement between the phenomenal world, Wh10h they knew to
be structured, and the ph7sioal.

They saw

that the "field" re-

terred to by the physioists was nothIng but the Gestalt concept
applIed to a physioal sett1ng_

An openIng had been made for the

systematio applioation ot the Gestalt Qonoept to the whole realm
of physioal sOienoes.
But tor the GestaltI8t formIng the theory of 1somorphIsm,

. SXbld., p. 49.
6Kottka Th

.so
the blggest bone of contention was the not1on that had taken predominanoe in the physloal sclenoes ln the latter part of the nlne
teenth oentury_

Aooording to this notlon, as we ssw. physios

is a molecular solence.

It is a study of the mlnutest entitles,

the size of wh10h was d1mlnlsh1ng by the day-

The new field

theory had by no means been universally acoepted by the sclentists.

It was clear that 1t would be no small t.sk for the Ges-

taltlsts to establ1sh thelr ldeas ln the physloal sclenoes.

The

•
man who tinally undertook thls monumental task was Wolfgang Kohler.

We will first take an example or two ot

slaple ohemioal oompounds.

•

Kohl~r's

work in

We will then study his extensive work

ln the eleotro-magnetl0 fleld •

•
Kohler
held that physlos is pre-eminently a molar rather
than a moleoular solence.

He was oonvinoed that, Just as ln the

phenomenal world. so ln the inorganl0 (the geographical environment), a compos1te 1s somethlng more than the sum of its 1ndiv1d-

ua1 parts.

To prove this he flrst performed exper1ments with

relatively simple composltes suoh as water.

•
Koffka quotes Koh-

ler's hydrogen-oxysen example'as follows:
Let us take the slmplest example we can f1nd: water is expla1ned by the atomiC theory as a compound of two elements,
hydrogen and oxygen, ln suoh a way that lt 'oons1sts of molecules, eaoh ot whlch 1s oomposed of three atoms, two of hydrogen and one of oxygen • • • Thus we have H. H2 , H20. Thl
Bounds like a straight moleoular theory, but 1t Is not anything ot the kind. For H, HZ, and H20 have all dlfterent
propertles Whioh cannot be derived by adding propertles
ot a's and O·s. And ln accordanoe with that, physios endeavours to construot models of atoms and moleoules whl0h
are Just as dlfferent from each other as the actually ob.erved substanoes. 'l.'he slmple hydrogen atom conslsts ot

,....
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one proton and one eleotron ln verl der,nlte dynamic relatlonshlp expressed in terms of the Rutherford-Bohr theory
• • • A completely new system has been formed. • • It is
wrong to say that thls system water consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. For where are they to
be found??
Another example of the Gestalt thesls, thls tlme one from
an every day 11fe ocourrenoe,. ls to

be

duced by liqulds by surface tensions.

found ln

the

patterns pro-

11

Kohler descrlbes the pheno-

menon in thls way:
If one pours oil lnto a 11quld of equal denslty, but. kind
with which the 011 wl11 not mix, surfaoe tensions alte~ the
shape of the boundary llnes untl1 the 011 floats in the
other liquld in the form ot a sphere. This ocours beoauf.
of dynaml0 prooesses at the boundary of the two liqulds. 6
The idea of molar properties in such solences as physios and chemistry was beglnning to take hold.

But there was one area of the

•
phys10al soiences which Kohler
felt would be more susoeptible to
the Gestalt concept than any other.

That was the area ot eleotro-

magnetio f1elds.
For an experimental proof, then, of the theory of structural·
1zation in the geographical env1ronment, Kohler
needed def1nlte
"
sOient1f10 or1ter1a. to apply in the field of eleotro-magnetlsm.
He found these 1n von Ehrenfel.' two oriteria of form, the same
oriteria that we saw 1n the last ohapter 1n oonnection wlth the
phenomenal env1ronment.

The

criteria oan be expla.ined as follows:

(1) physloal forms are someth1ng more than mere

?Koffka, ~ f£lDQ1Qles. • • , p. 57.
8Katz , p. 58.

·and~oonneotlons ••

Another way of puttlng thls would be:
sum of lts 1ndlvldual parts.

the whole 1s more than the

In the example above of the com-

pos1te, water, we saw that thls 1s true.

The elements that torm

the compos1te, water, cannot be found 1n that composIte.

There

1s a real 9YllltAtive dlrtlt!nc! between the whole and 1ts parts.
(2) The second cr1terIon states that the ph.ys1oal forms ment10ned
are transposable.

This means that the oharacterist10 structure

of a given systaw 1s retained even 1f all the parts are on a oompletely d1fferent plane.

'l'herefore, not only 18 there a quallta-

tive d1fference between the whole and the parts, as we saw 1n the
f1rst or1terIon, but the Whole 1s actually 1ndependent of the part
1f It fulfIlls the requ1rements of the seoond or1terlon. 9
The exper1ment moat frequently used to show that the,e orlter1a oan be met in the fleld of electro-magnet1s. 1s the distribut10n of a g1ven quant1tr of eleotrio1ty 1n an lso1ated oonduotor
of defin1te shape.

We will first give the general exper1ment as

It 1s desoribed by K&hler.

Then we w1ll apply the two or1ter1a.

XAhler d.soribes the experiment as follows:
It the oonduoter 1s supp11ed at a g1ven instant wlth an eleotr10 oharge of any arb1trary d1stribution and thereafter
lett alone, there results a spontaneous arrangement of equil1brium dlstr1but1on. • • It 1s therefore oorreot to deslSnate this distr1but1on the -natural structure" of the oharge
upon the g1ven oonduotor.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
It Islmposslble to deo~.ase, lncrease, or dlsplace any part
of thls oharge alone; tor w1th any suoh ohange there ooours

9Katz, p. SSe See also Petermann, pp. 36-37, tor further
development of the von Ehrenfels' or1terla.
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A r.aotlon throughout the ent,lN natural strLlctu.r8. • •10
~h.

application of the first oriter1on ls obvioua.

For the

dlstribution of electrioity in the conductor i& not a .mere and-

oonnect1on of parts.

It 18 more than this.

It 1s a clo.8 knit

physioal sTste. th. parte ot whioh are all inteNependent.

'there

1s a defin1te relationshlp, a quality of tne whole that was not
there before.

"At no place in tne oonduotor oan a quantity ot

eleotricity be removed or a,4ded w1thout causing

re-<Uatrlbutlon
11
of eleotJ"lo1ty ln the ent1re syate ... • eomtlentsKatz.
1m.u••• a

K~hl.r ••,8,

e1.140,

II

there 1s a real phys10al pattern pre.ent, a struoture

the parts ot willeh react as part. of awho1•• u:
All to the seoond crlt.rlon, traupoaabi11ty, we ae. that

the sue phenomenon take. place 1n tt18 physioal world or tne geo-

raphloal environment .a took place in tho behavioral enVironment
hen we app11ed the exper1ment of melody.

POl'

in the .81041

lOwoltlana K!hler,·Phyal0al Gestalten," lIta summarlzed in
1118, p. 28.
11Kate t p.

'5.

12&Oftke ilv.. another example whl0h perhaps glves a olearer
pioture : - . . . two lusw.ate4 oondensers ot equal c&pa01tl are placed at a great distance trom e&CJh other ln a
homos.neous dielectric. I convey to each ot them the ....
amount or eleotriclty E. Then they bave an ~ Oh.arge.
uut th1. equallt,i. a purely 10iloal equall~Nothin&
1n the world compels .. to oompare Just the.e two Charge.
with eaoh oth.r. Ph,&Uoally, tnere 18 in this caae no
dy~.lo~allty of equality.
Indeed loan alter the &moun
of the charse in elther 01" the oondensers with.out thereb, a.tteotlng the amount on the other. When, however, 1
Jom the two oondensers by a. piece of w1ro. the equality
of their
, >Charges haa 'beoome a ph¥sloal, dynam10 reality.-

experiment we saw that the ohange in musioal key necess1tated a
real physioal ohange 111 the sound-wave frequency of eaoh one ot
the notes.

However. the over-all pattern remained the same; the

melody was recognized as the same.

In the same manner, when the

quantity- of eleotrioity is ohanged in the isolated oonduotor, ita
oharaoteristio eleotro-magnetio struoture remains the same.
part keeps its identioal

rellt~v!

oharge throughout is greater.

Baoh

value and position although the

The charaoterist1c structure ot

the whole seems to be actually independent of' the eleotric charge
of its oonstituent parts.

ment, Katz adds:

u

Again commenting on Kohler's experi-

liThe characteristlc structure of the charge is

not altered even 1f the carrier, whether it be a w1re, plate, or
other form, 1s enlarged or made smaller w1thout oha.nging lts geometriC pattern."l;

K~hler finished his desoript1on of his eXperi-

aJA

ment with the electr1c wire conductor with th1s statement:

A~

~

etryotur!s

~

stat. x 9ht£g.! uR9S coaQHctQ£8

~

glyen

'baRe Ire Ebl!ioal Oest§1tIQ._14
We have seen some of the experiments ot the Gestalt1sts,

•

especlally Kohler, performed in order to prove that Gestalten actually ex1st in the geograph1oal environment.

But other areas be-

81d.s the ones we have mentioned were also attaoked with the same
purpose in m1nd.

As Petermann say I :

A large number of other quit. slmilar examples oan be ranged

l)Katz, p. 55.
141(:."', ...... _-ohuaino1 n .....+-""+.:. ....

It

om

-

,-

-- .... -tn .. A

" ...... "

..........

")Il.

55
w1th th1s, the electr10 oonductor experlment. Distrlbutlons of thermodynamloal equl11brlum, dlstrlbutlons of therman energy. dlstrlbutions of eleotrioal potent1al ln a fleld,
distributions of statlonary ourrents, e1ther of diffuslon
ourrents 0iSof eleotrlc or hydrodynam1o or heat ourrents;
and 80 on.
Petermann concludes this sectlon of hls book as follows:
All ln all, a foundatlon thus emerges for the thesis that
genuine -gestalten- ocour ln physios. 'l'he gestalt category
ls therefore taken to have been proved to be a conceptual
torm prlmary tor the sphere of physlos a8 well. and urgently
requlrlng recognltlon of lts singularlty.lb
Thus tar we have seen the appllcatlon of the Gestalt concept
to two environments in perceptlon.

In the second chapter we saw

its applloatlon to the behavioral envlronment, and ln thls Chapter
so tar we have seen lt applled to the geographlcal envlronment.
But ln order to establish the theory ot 1somorphlsm w1th any degree ot certitude, the Gestalt phyChologlsts knew that extenslve
work 1n the area of the ph18101og1cal environment would have to
be undertaken.

This work was undertaken agaln mainly bl K&hler.

aere we w111 f1rst see the reasoning and theorlz1ng whlch preceded
the aotual eXperimentatlon in the phy'slo1oglcal processes.

'Z'hen

,8.
16petersann, p. '9. It seems that all the leadlng Gestalt
theorlsts ot the Berlin school are 1n agreement as to the results
15petermann, p.

ot the1r experlmentat10n in the geographlcal env1ronment. Speaklng ot this environment as the Wg1ven,· M. Wertheimer says: -The
g1ven 1s ltselt ln var,1ng degrees ·struotured- (-gestaltet-),
it conslsts ot more or less definitely struotured wholes and whole~
processes w1th the1r whole-propertles and laws, charaoterlstlc
whole.tendencies and whole-determ1nat1onA of parts. 'Pleces' almost always appear 'as parts' ln whcle processes." (See Wertheimer
-The General Theoretlcal Situa.tlon,· as summarized 1n Bllls. p.
14.)
.

56
we will take up that exper1mentatlon ltselt.
"Denn was lnnen, das 1st aussen.- 11

..

Kohler often quotes thls

llne from Goethe whloh expresses, for hlm, one of the most
pr1nolples of Gestalt theory of knowledge.

~he

1mporta~t

quotatlon expresses

tor K~bler the Gestalt applioation of the theory of lsomorphlsm
to the phySiologlcal environment.

He means by 1t, of oourse, that

the form seen 1n the 1mmediate experienoe of the phenomenal enVirQ1.ment has a torm exactly like 1t in the underlying phySiologlcal
environment.

The "innen- in the quotation reters, then, to the

phenomenal envlronment, and the Maussen- reters not to the
graphioal but to the physiological environment.

Here

ge~

agai~.

lt

is the torm experlenoed in the behavloral envlronment that must
be

explained and substantiated by the establishment of forms in

the phys101og1cal enVironment.

In brlef, the hypothesls of torms

in physiological prooesses i8 aa follows:
-Our working DTPothes18 atates that the speoifl0 arrangement
ot actual experienoe ls an aoourate reproduotlon of a dynam10ally functlonlng arrang,.ent of the correspondlng physio10g1eal brain process8s.- 16
The general hypothesls of struotured physlolog1cal processes
parallellng the struotures of dlreot oonsolousness had f1rst been
made by werthelmer. 19

p.

33.

But lt was not untll KAhler applled thls

17K6hler. ·PbYsioal GeatalteuL M as summarized in ElliS,
See a180 K6hler, SJ:I.I1. PliCa •• p. 114, n. 1.
18xatz , p. 56. In thls seot1on, Katz ls quotlng K~hler.

19KAhler atates thls ln hls artlcle, ·Physlcal Gestalten- 8S
summarized by Ell18, p. 3). See also Petermann, pp. '5 and 39-41
tor the 8ame.
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general hypothesis to conorete experimentatlon that it became ao ...
tualll useful.
K&hler approaohed the problem by reasonlng in this manner.
we see in our own immediate experienoe (the behavioral environment
structured whole., Gestalten.
all Gestalt reasoning.

This is a certalntyacoord1ng to

•
And now, Kohler
continued, we have posi-

tive grounds tor holding that th. total geograph1cal environment
is a struotured field.

The question was, how to apply this same

field theory to the physlologlcal environment.

Looklng for some.

thtng in oommon between the geographlcal and physiolog1cal enVironments, K&hler at onoe saw the answer to his difficulty.

Both

the geographlcal and physlolog1cal env1ronments are in the realm
of the phys10al solenoes; they are both governed by laws whioh
&1".

basioally those of physiOs and ohemistry. 20

But, as has been

shown, the geographloal environment is itself truly made up of

•
Theretore, Kohler
concluded, the phf8iological environment should a180 oome under the field oonoept. 21

flelds of physlcal foroes.

Petermann gives a good summary of K&hlerts reasoning in this matter as tollows:
S1nCe it has been shown that there are ln pOint of faot physloal gestalten, we may assume that such gestalt processes
20 In the last Chapter of this thes1s we Will see a more thor.
ough treatment of the laws affeoting the different environments.

21Wertheiller was really the first to t'ormulate the physiological-field hypothesls, but it was left to K~hler to transform
Wertheimer's general notions lnto a work1ng hypothesis. See
Petermann, p. 39-40.
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are also speoifloally developed in the nervous system. The~
arlse, for example, as oonfigured processes even ln the retlnal perlphery_ Henoe 1so1ated stlmull upon whloh the other prooesses could be built up are no longer present there.
and they extend from there through the entire "longitudinal
seotion" of the "optiC sector" as far as the central zones,
in suoh a manner that the whole optiC sector presents a
unltary reglon of exoitation whlch ls oonflgured throughout
lta extent--1n the same sense.as aU !lectrloal neld may be
sald to be so, acoordlng to Kohler. 2
By thls detailed descrlpt10n we oan see that K~hler traces the
outllne of hls theory throughout the whole physlological envlronment trom the nervous system to the end organs themselves.
Another reason oompelllng th.e Gestalt psyohologlsts to postu
late struoturallzatlon of the physIological enVIronment was the
olose causal relatlonshlp between the geographical and physiological environments.

They argued that environments ln such close

relatlonshlp should necessarlly be of the same sen.ral structural
character.

Koffka states thelr complex reasonlng ln th1s way:

Furthermore, 1f B stande tor the behavioural world, 0 for
the geograph1cal, and P for the physiological prooesses,
B~ shows the relatlonsh1p.
Now P is in causal Gonnectlon
wlth G and ln a more dlreot oonnectlon w1th B; the usual
asyumption, whlch we shall prove to be erroneous, was that
P and G were 1n close geometrIcal correspondence, whereas
Band P were totally dlfferent. Does not such an assumptlon
make It totally unlntelllg1ble that B oan glve UII informatlon about 01 For lf B is totally unllke P, and P ls very
muoh 11ke a, how can B lead to G1 If, however Band Pare
essent1ally allke, then lt only depends upon the G-P relatlon when and how we can galn knowledge about 0 from P.
And lf it 1s 80, then surely observatlon of B reveals to
us pl~opert les ot p .2'
22Petermann, p. 39.
2'Kottka, ~ grkGc,ple.. • • • p. 62.
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Wlth thls reasoning and theorizing as a start, the Gestalt
psyOhologists went to experimentatlon to verify their theorles.
Their first step was to show that general anatomy ls a molar, not
a moleoular so lence. 24

X'he nervous system and the brain were a-

mong the first areas to undergo rigorous experimentat1on.

It was

disoovered that neural aotivity and brain waves are of the same
element as electl"1c impulses" in a oonduotor. 2" It was clear then
that the same structural patterns whioh occur in

eleo~rioally

charged oonduotors would also oocur in the nervous system and
braln.

It so, a fleld theory of the total nervous system could

be established mak1ng the anatomy of the nervous system a molar,

not a moleeular sclenoe.

For the reactlons to stimuli would not

then be a mere matter of one nerve or one line of nerves reaoting
to a stlmulus, but eaoh stimulus wou.ld ore ate a total ohain reaotion throughout the whole system and this reaction would finally
produce a behavior of the total organism.

'lhe mechanical stimulus"

response process of segregated seotions of the organism would be
ruled out.
The big difficulty for the aestaltists to overoome was

whethe~

the individual nerve r1bers were insulated from each other or not.
It they were 1nsulated. the meohanist10 theory would still hold
even if the impulses themselves were eleotrio in nature.
puts the question in this way;

24 Ib1d •• p. 56.

2S Tll!.nl.,...

--

Va'". in t:n9 W",...1A

-
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Koftka
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Are the indiVidual nervous struotures whioh anatomy
has revealed, completely insulated from eaoh other or notT
Only it the answer were affirmative would the traditional
theory of a mere additive pattern be possible •• As soon as
the lnsulation is found to be incomplete, a theory of molar
distribution must take its place. 'l'herefore the anatom1cal
eV1dence so tar adduced is insuffioient to support the old
theory • • • It is true that the nerve fibres are insulated
from eaoh other over long distanoes, but there are innumerable cross connections whioh probably connect every nerve
coll with every other. • • P hy.iologiaal processes in extenslon, then, have not been invented 1n order to support
a particular theOn. They are demanded by the anatomical
tacts themselves.
The results of experI.entation were as the Gestaltists bad
thought, then.

Koffka sa.ys of experiments conducted on the oor-

tex of a dog's brain:
Two recent invEh.tig!::!tions from the phyohologloal laboratory
of the University of Kansas give direct experImental support
to thls view i.e. that the nerve fibers are not lnsulated •
'rhey ahow that the aotion currents ot tIle dog'. oortex which
result from looalised stimulation are not restrioted to small
areas of thlrl00rtex but torm a pattern pervadlng the whole
cortex • • • \ .
By theae experiments the Gestaltlst • •eem def1nitely to have 80me
basls in taot for their olaim that the oortex is not 22IPletely
1nsulated.

But this faot 1s enough for them, for only if there

were perfect inuul~tlon would the beh&vior1st theory hold. 28
However

~ortant

the above quoted experlments may be to the

Gestalt theorlsts, the real 9QQQ

~

grac. for mechan1stio theories

was performed by K. S. Lashley.

In the experiments Cited above

26Koffka, The princlples • • • • p. 60.
27Ab~g., p. 61.

28Ip~d., p. 60.

61
the Gestaltlsts showed the eleotr1cal nature of neural aot1v1ty
and from this argued to structural1sm 1n the physiolog1cal processes.

By the experiments of Lashley the Gestalt theorles were

put lnto the actual language and oontext of the physlologist himself.
But let us look at the work of Lasraey and judge for ourselves.

Lashle, began his experlmental investigations as a oon-

f1rmed behaViorist.

Hls intent was to show exper1mentally that

the behavior1sts' oondit1oned response and the reflex arc provided

.

an adequate explanatlon of the adaptive conduct of organisms.
But, as Hartmann. says, • [D) arel, a dttoade later, the 10g1c of

his own. find1ngs had foroed hlm lnto the opposite[i.e., the Ges-

talt) oamp. a2 9
The t1rst great eXper1mental dlscovery was that response
to stimulation 1s not dependent upon certaln areas of the cerebral
oortex, as all prevlous theorles had held.

Hartmann desorlbes

the experiments:

means of a thermooautery, varying amounts and dlfferent
parts of the oortex in a large group of rats were destroyed
and their le8rnl~ reoords made atter reoover, from the operation (10·,0 days) oompared with those of normal animals 1n
suoh tasks as maze-running, brightness disorim1nat1on, etc.
Comparlng the reoords for the two groups aocording to errors,
time, an4 number ot trials. Lashley found that in general
the oerebral lesion. were attended by an lnorease in the
amount of praotloe necessary to solve the problems, but that
the geit!! ~ deterigr!tlon ia lea£Q1Bi igl1.tz ~ reteutly.ness wM yroport.onal !.2. the 2JiOqQt .2t.. llra.ll tissue .111By

290 •

w.

Hartmann, Q!atalt PSYOhglQgY (New York, 1935), p. 54.
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jured and lndependent of the area of the oortex affeoted. JO
The mere meohanloal explanat10n of defln1te local stimulations
glvlng rlse to def1nlte looal responses--all followlng wlth

machln~

11ke preclslon--suftered great damage by thls exper1ment.
Atter thls flrst break w1th orthodox behav1orism, Lashley
went on to develop and re1ntegrate hls f1nd1ngs.

The further he

progresses the oloser he seems to oome to the Gestalt oamp.

ae

even beg1ns to use Gestalt term1nology. such as tn.e ott-repeated
word ·pattern.·

For 1nstanoe, speak1ng of v1sual porcept1on,

he s8yS:

• ('1'1 he response 1s determined by the proport lons of the
pattern and w1thin the 11mlts of vlsual acu1ty, 18 1ndependent ot the part10ular cells excited.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The activ1ty of the v1sual cortex must resemble that of
one of the electric slgns ln which Q pattern ot letters
pass.s rapidly across a atationary group ot lamps. The
structural pattern 1s flxed, but the funotlonal pattern
pla,s over it Without limltat10n to speolflc ele.ents.,)l
In another plaoe Lashley seems deflnltely to adopt the Gestalt
not1ons of ·pragnlnz a and the -dynamlC act1v1ty· of the physiologleal environment when be says:
'Unity of aot1on seems to be more deeply rooted than even
structural organlzatlon.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Such phenomena aa tho.e observed ln anlmal behav10r suggest
that the nervous system 1s capable ot self-regulatlon whloh
g1ves a coherent loglcal charaoter to lts function1ng, no
matter how 1ts anatomical const1tuents may be d1sturbed.,)2
)0l,W.

,1

ll1J4 •• pp. S6-57.

32 1'hid

nn

CR_4IlO

6)
There 1s no doubt of the conf1rmatory character these experlments of Lashley had on the Gestalt physiological hypotheses •
The evidence stands on its own feet.

•
The notion that Kohler
had

fir.t hypothesized with the phrase:
aussen,· had now the bulwarks of experimentat10n for a backing.
With this evidence establlshed we can now 80 on to some of the
more

.i~te

pOints involved 1n the Gestalt1sts' theor1es on the

physiological env1ronment.

The tact that the nervous syatem and the cortlcal sector

ot the braln are held to be molar structures doe. not mean that
the Gestalt psychologists deDJ the molecular facta of anatomy.
Bather. they make the same distlnction here as they do concernlng
molecular properties ln the geographical and behavioral environments.

They say. again that although the parts are present. the

Whole i8 something over and above--ln faot different from--the
parts.))
One of the most important notions .tressed in the Gestalt
d1stlnotlon between part

and.

Whole is the lnterdepemenoe of the

parts within the Whole. the denial that the parts are mere andsummatlona. 34 A discusslon of this notion of interdependenoe of
parts and the field that arlses oonsequent to it ls ln order there
rore.

We saw the example of what KoCrka oalls -real equality· of

))KOfrka,

;,4

Tn.

Prinoiple,- •• , p. 176.

"Ibid •• ~. 64~ Ellis

tt. 64.
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electrl0 charge in two condensers. 35

~'he charge ls equal only

when the two oondensers are joined by a wlre.
of oharge varies 1n each condenser exactly.

Then the amount
If one condenser 18

altered, the other lmmed1ately undergoes a llke ohange.

Thls

shows the real dependendenoe one part of the whole system has on
the other.

The same 1s true ot the current on an electr1c plate.

It spreads itselt as equally as posslble in all areas ot the plate
wlth eaoh ohan$e ot oharge ln one seotor, the whole plate
undergoes a ohange. J6 App11ed to anatomy the concept of 1nterand

dependenoe of parts
a group of oells.

r~le8

out the lsolated reaotlon of a cell or

aather, because of the lnterdependence ot the

cells, w1th each excltatlon of a cell the whole physlo1oglcal
envlronment reacts. J? Hence, we oan see Why the Gestalt psychologlsts hold that perceptlon ls a study ot the aotlon and reaotlon
of whole environments and not merely of lndependent cells.
all the 1nterdepeBdent parts form flelds of actlvlty.

Por

And these

flelds, ln thelr interaction upon one another, are the real determlnants of behaVior.'S
The Gestaltists have worked out an elaborate system to show
how the field of electrlc nafT. torces in the physiologlcal en3SKottka, The Prinolpl,s. • • , p. 59.
of thls theais.
;6petermann,p.

See p. 54 n. 12

,8.

J?K&hler, Va.ul !a ~ WQ£~d 2t Facts, pp 201 and 211.
)SKOrfa, I.bI. fr1nc~ple! •• _, p. 42; Werthelmer,
-Gestalt Theory,- as summarized ln El11s, p. 6.
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vironment aotually causes our peroeptions.

Aooording to thelr

theory, the physiologioal environment is a statio neutral fleld

In

before sensatlon, a f1eld of homogeneously oharged lons.
state the envlronment oan

b~

wrltlng has been put on it.

thls

compared to a blaokboard before any
When an exoltat1on dlsturbs thls

fleld there ls an instantaneous reaotlon of 10ns. taking on the
form and 1ntensity of the excltatlon.

The heterogeneously Oharged

ions 1mmed1ately become dlstinguished from the rest.

Th1s con...

centration ot reaoting lons, then, ls the flgure. and the und1sturbed lons are the ground.

To expreas the dlfterence between

the two physlcally. we oan say that both the f1gure and the ground
have a dlffe.rent eleotrostatl0 potentlal.

Thus the figure to be

ooncentrated upon ln perception has a oharge wh10h ls heterogeneous to lts total surround1ng area.
flrmly agalnst lts bacqround.

(Ihis makes 1t stand out

And ln Ol1l' phenomenal envlronment

we have the oonsolous experienoe of a certaln flgure high-11ghted
agalnst lts background.)9
We can see from the above th$t when the Gestalt theorlsts
speak ot equallty or 11kene.s of torm, 1.e. , isomorphlsm, they
mean Just that.

For just as the react1ng lons on the screen of

a televislon set reflect a real torm, so do those of the physiolog1cal processes.

There 1s an accurate reproductlon in the bra1n

prooesses of the real objeot outside.

It

Katz says that "Kohler'.

)9K~hler, ia,u! la tn. World Qt P,ct., pp. 209-215; K~hler.
·Physical Gestalten," as summarlzed in Ell18, pp. 28-29.
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theory of isomorphism goes so far as to conjecture that tit will
be shown that the phenomenal world is literally the expression
of circumstances in the braln. 1u40
Does the "like form" mean an exact reproduction of the consoious lmage in the phys1cal prooesses?
hold that there is
llke

8

~aot

reproduction.

'I'he Gestaltlsts do not
The reproduction ls more

"map· in comparison with the country which it represents.

A map is very d1fferent trom the actual

country~

However. oertain

shapes and relations in the map correspond proportionally to those
of the oountry.

"What is h1gher up in the map is farther north

1n the oountry.

~Jhat

appears on the map as a Wiggly line is pre-

sent in the oountry as a river.

If we could lnspeot a person's

braln processes as well as we can see a map, • • • we could read
off his experlences as we read a map.·4~
These llke forms or lmages ln the brain whlch represent the
objeot are oalled "oortlcal correlates· 42 ot the object. The
better the oortlcal representation is. the better is our perception and the closer we oome to perfect knowledge of the outer
reallty.43

The Gestalt phychologists hold that their theory ot

40 Kat z , p • .56. Katz ls here only extendlng the already establlshed similarlty between the different enVironments.

41

Woodworth, p. 13.5.

42 K5h1er, Value JJ! the World of .Faots, pp. 194 and 218.

43Ibld'~, p. 218; Kt,hler. ItSome Gestalt problems," as
summarized in Ellls, p. 63.

isomQrphism is a much better explanation of how we get knowledge
of reality than that of the mechanists, who offer

tlO

reason for

our knowledge of things as they are.
To the Gestalt psychologists the value of such a theory as
that of isomorphism could be tremendous.

It affords knowledge

of areas whioh have always been stumbling blooks to psyohologists.
For the realm of the physiological processes, especially the brain
has always been a mystery to man. 44 In the past the nlethods used
by psyohologists never seemed. adaptable to the unknown areas.
but w1th the theory of isomorphism this dlf:t'icUlty can be obviated
For
Physical forms are obviously approaohable by phys1cal methods
of 1nvestigation. And if the forms of exper1ence correspond
to recogn1zable phys lca1 forms in the nervous syste;:n, a path
1s opened to tne study of the brain processes concerned.
It 1s an approaoh wh1ch promises far more reliable results
than tl1e lJlore or less speculative methods of the older psyChology_ 4.,
The knowledge ga1ned from 1nvest1gat1on of the physiological processes will in turn add to our knowledge of the outs1de world
and the phenomenal world besides.

Henc., this new theory and

approaoh has as its purpose an ever widen1ng circle of knowledge
about psyOhological facts.

For each new fact learned about one

environment g1ves us added knowledge of the others and vice versa.
It is hoped that th1s new dynamic tbeory w1ll have its effeot

44 K!hler, Value in the World gi Facts, p. 207; Koffka, The
prinoiples • • • • p. 65.

4S Katz , p. 55·
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in other sCiences besides PSYChology.46

Petermann gives ~s an

.

idea ot the aoope and depth ot this theory when he says:
.

Kohler's gestalt standpoint here apparently reveals its torce in one of the most profound of metaphysical
problems. Going 0, it, he presents in a most consistent
form the logical or ontolog1cal pos1tion of the entire range
ot all possible problems ot wholeness Wh10h sOient1fic reflection encounters. The whole extent ot these quest1ons-from psyChology and physiology to gene,al biology--w1thout
exoept1on, 1n pr1no1ple fits in with Kohler-a idea of the
·physical gestalt."
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
No matter whether, 1n oritioally ooming to terms with 1t,
one aooepts or rejects this theory as 1t standa, one w111
not be able ent1rely to resist the impress10n that it represents an ~ndenlably lmpos1ng body of th1nklng ln natural
phllosophy.41
'I'h~s

Isomorphism, then, is a valuable Gestalt hypotheala whioh
ls well substantiated by obJeot1ve eV1denoe.

But in spite of

all this eVidence, the leading Oestaltists still prefer to oall
1t an hypotheSiS, and they are r1ght ln doing so; for it is by

•
no means an estab11shed fact. Kohler,
however, use.s the terms
·work1ng h7Pothesls· 48 1n reference to 1aoDlorphlsll; for, a. he
8878, it could be the instrument of much new knowledge.

On the

other hand, opponents of the Gestalt sohool often crit10ise the
theory beoause, as the, say. 1t does not have suffiolent experlmental proof to support it.
the case w1th any hypothesl..

To th1s K~hler answers that such is
Suoh was true in the case of Ampere a

46petermannt p. 56; Wer, Vi\l.U! J..D. l.W!. World 9.I.. Fic tl,
p. 218; Koffka, In! prlnolplll_ •• , p.

6,.

47petermann, pp. 43-44.

48 58• Katz's quote of K~hler, p. 56.

theory of magnetism, the kinetic theory of gases, the eleotronic
theory, and many others.

Some of the assumptions mentIoned have

already been verified while others are still In the realm of pure
hypothesIs.

II

"But physiOs and ohem1stry,· says Kohler, ·would have

been oondemned to a permanent embryon1c state had they absta1ned
from suoh hrpotheses. • •• 49
In summary. then, isomorphism is the complex th£ory (applied
in a threefold area) which completes the Gestalt concept of peroeption.

It attempts to answer the main objections of atomistic

psychology by showing that not only in the phenomenal enVironment
but also 1n the geographical and Phys101ogical
det1nlte Wholes.

8S

well there exist

These are the "ultimate" causes for our per-

oeptual sensations of wholeness.

Th1s oasic theory. 1n addition.

include. a rejection of the traditionally accepted Humean form
of causality, and It postulat@s real physical oausality between
the object and the subJeot.s physiolog1cal processes.

Conso1ous-

ness it.alf, it 1s sa1d, 1s a neoessary concomitant of the aotion

ot the phys1olog1cal prooesses.

The 1mportant thlng is that each

of the three interact1ng enVironments is a struoturl4 f1eld w1th
with interrelAted part,_

Experimental Investigat10ns enter into

eaoh phase of the theory of 1somorphism for purposes of verifioation.
While it must be adm1tted that the Gestalt concepts pose
~mmediate

and serious difficult1es to any theory of meohanist10
n

6b.
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atomism. certain quest10ns still remain as to the 1mp11oations
of the Gestalt hypotheses.

Furthermore, atter asoertain1ng these

imp11oations, we must ask ourselves whether they are consistent
w1th the express doctr111es ot Gestalt..

It w111 be the burden of

the next ohapter to answer such questions and evaluate the Gestalt theory 1n the l1ght of these answers.

CHAPTER IV
IMPLICATIONS AND CRITICISM
In order to arr1ve at a true knowledge of thelmp11oatlons
involved 1n any theory one should look for an element 1n that
theory whloh ls perslstent throughout, something whloh wll1 be
found wherever one studies the theory.

Now to the person studylng

the Gestalt theory of peroeption one of 1ts most striklng oharaoterlstlos is the presenoe of
tlon.

l!!a throughout the whole explana-

Eaoh envlronmental f1eld enter1ng lnto sensation has a

deflnite set of laws governlng lts aotiv1ty.

The Oestalt1;.;(;s

often speak of the ·lnner laws· 1 ot the parts and the -inner
foroes· a d1reoted toward a oertaln goal.

And what is the reason

tor thls emphasis on law and order in peroeption?

It 1s partly

beoause of the Gestalt insistenoe upon the lnterrelation between
all the parts and the whole, thus reJeotlng the -haphazard-' aotivity of parts necessarlly consequent upon a meohanlst1c theory
of peroeptlon.
lWerthelmer, 8The General Theoretloal Sltuatlon,- a~ summarlzed by Ellis, p. IS.
2
p. 64.

X&hler. ·SoaeOestalt Froblems, - as summar1zed by EL11s,

J~ •• p. 6.5.
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However, another, perhaps more 1mportant, reason for the
ins1stence uponllaw. ls Gestalt's oomllittment to a ph1losophy

ot. let us oall it, "probabil1ty.·

'llhe

<lestal t phyChologists

do not hold 1n any way the doctrine of immediate experienoe, exoept perhaps the 1mmed1ate exper1ence anyone would admit of his
own subjeot1ve mod1f1oatiolls. They hold that we have only ft1n_
dlreot- 4 knowledge ot the outside world. We do not have a complete knowledge of real1ty but only ·partlal-S knowledge.

Hence,

because of this mediate knowledge, we "sssume"6 the exlstence of
real objects.

Th1s whole dootr1ne of "probability" 1s the natural

outcome of the Gestalt theory of peroeption and sense knowledge.
For, as we saw ln the second ohapter, the subjeot of Gestalt peroeptlon 1s easl1y decelved.

He is hardly ever in direot contact

with the "d1stant" st1mulus, but rather he 1s directly affected
only by the proximate A st1mulus. 7 But the prox1mate stimulus has
been so influenced by the med1a. that it does not give a true pioture ot the obJeot.

For instanoe, light oomlng from the distant

stimulus hardly ever arrives d1reotly at the retina of the subJeot
It 18 often refleoted onoe, tw1ce, or perhaps several times from
other Objects.

Alao, the pos1tion of the distant stimulus affects

the retraot10n of llght rays and may obsoure our knowledge.
4Koftka, The f r ,nglpl,s. • • , p.

S.ll!.JA. t

p. 79.

6~., pp. 79-80.
7

'7.
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Koftke 88Y8:

~le oannot expect a very olose relat10nship between behavioural and geographioal things. For the light waves do
not depend only upon the things qua thlngs, but also upon
the nature of the source of 11ght (whloh only in the case
of self-luminous bod1es belongs to them as their own property) and on the position of the th1ngs w1th regard to our
own bodles.

..... .. ..... . ... .. .. ... . . .. .
...

Then we can say that our question why th1ngs look as they
do must f1nd 1ts answer not 1n terms of the dlstant, but
of the prox1mal stimuli. • • 'l'hs danger of this confus1on
11es 1n the faot that for eaoh d1stant stimulus there exists
a pract10ally inflnlte number of proximal stimuli; thus,
the "same st1mulus· in the dlstant sense may not be the same
stlmulus in th8 proximal sense; as a matter of faot, it very
seldom is. • •
All thpse reasons tend to oonvinoe the Gestalt theorlst that
the media of peroeptlon always obsoure the stimull somewhat.
the Gestalt dootrlne ot the

Heno,

fall1bility of sense peroep-

~ ~

tlon. 9
Thus amb1guity of peroeption is part and parcel of the Gestalt pioture of peroept1on.

But th1s poses a serious problem.

What basls do Gestaltlsts have tor oertltude?

How oan these psy-

Chologists mainta1n that their theory is tenable at all oons1der.
ing their aooeptance of so muoh obsourity in suoh an lmportant
phase of knowledge as perceptlon?

1'1'16 Gestalt theorlsts answer

suoh obJeot1ons by pregentins J. WhQl.! gY\1x .2t. lei. governing
peroeption in all its phases.

We will now inspect these laws as

8Koffka, lll! Prlnclples • • •

t

pp. 79-80.

9~ •• pp. 16-80. ~heir opinion on sense deoept1on 18 one
of the reasons why the Gestaltlsts lnslst upon their many experimentat10ns with ambiguous figures and optical 11lusions.
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they appear 1n the geographical, phys101ogical, and beha.vloral
environments respeotiYely, and we wl11 8ee what implications tollow tram these laws.
In the B!ggraphlctl eQvlrqnm'Bt, as we saw, the prOXimate
stimulus 1s attected by many faotors in the medla before reaohlng
the subject of peroeption.

The laws governing th1s environment

are those governing phYsioal bodies themselves.

Thus. in viaual

peroeption. for instanoe, the laws of light absorption and reflectlon come into play-

Also, as regards the posltion ot the

distant stimulus itselt. the laws of perspective are otten appllcable. 10 All suoh laws are able to be grouped under the general
titl.:

laws of physical being.

Th. law8 governing the phYllological environment do not differ essentially in type frOID those above.

'l'he nerve impulses

and brain waves of the body have the nature of electrio waves
and impulses. ll Therefore they follow the laws governing electriCity in phys1cal bodies 1n the tnorganl0 world.

Such laws as

p

thoae of Ampere on unit eleotrl0 measurement and MaXwell on eleotromagnet1c fields would be the main law8 in this oategor,._

In the behayaoral

'UI~ronm!nt

we find law8 whloh are many

and varied govern1ng the d1fferent phaBea of phenomenal percept10n
The pregnanc,. law, of Whioh we have often spoken, is perhaps the

10 KO ffka. Tn! prlno'2. el • • • • p. 79.

l1K&hler,

vI."' Jn the

Wor,d g( F!ctl,

pp. 214-215.
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most 1mportant and most w1dely used law 1n the Gestalt behavioral
env1ronment.

It states:

"PsyCholog1cal organ1zation w1ll always

be as good as the control11ng c1rcumstances permit. 1t12
form the law seems. anyth1ng but definite.

In this

However, as has been

seen. Katz clears up some of the obscurity by explaining:

"It

would be emphas1zed that 'good' refers to such character1stics
as regularity, symmetry, 1nclusiveness, unity, harmony, maximal
simplicity and conciseness ... 13 F1gure 2 g1ves a typical example
of how the law of pregnancy works.

In this example a figure which

is not ent1rely symmetrical seems symmetrical to the observer at
first glance.

The subject organizes the stimulus situat10n into
i.

an exper1ence as "good" as the control11ng c1rcumstances will
!

•

perm1t.

FIGURE 2

THE LAW OF PRAGNINZ
Other laws which playa role 1n the subjective organizat1on
of the perceptual-behav1oral field are: the law of proximity.14

12Katz, p. 40.
l3jlli.

14See Chapter II, pp. 29-30 of this thesis.
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the law of similarlty, the law of olosed forms, etc. 1S
of slmI1arity, for lnstanoe, states:

The law

·When more than one kind

of element is present, those whlch are sim11ar tend to form

Other thlngs be ing equal,
lines whlch enclose a surface tend to be seen a8 a unlt ... 16
And

the law of olosed forms says:

groups~·

II

Such are the rules govern1ng the behaVloral environment.
They are 1n many respects 1dentlca.l wlth rules used by other systems of psyohology to explain perceptual phenomena.

Their purpose

11ke that of the rules of the geographioal and physIological enVironments, 1s to put sCientlfl0 oertitude lnto the obsourity
neoessarl1y resultant on a doctrine that holds no immedlate knowledge of the outside world.
drawbacks as all other

But hls explanatlon suffers the 8ame

A R£&qrlli'9 explanatlon8 fashioned to

expla1n the lame41atel, known.

It .eems artlfiolal and leaves

several important questlons unan8wered.

The moat 1mportant of

theae questions entails the origin of the laws them.elves.

If,

•• the Gestaltists say, the st1mulus remains dlstorted, whence
doe8 the law and order suddenly arlae correcting the distortlQn?
The law8 ot themselves w111 not explaln the dlfficult,.

In the

Gestalt explanatlon, the, are 1ntroduoed as a sort ot 4IUI !A

maoqlDf intervening and sav1ng the Oestaltist from the uncerta1nty
of his geolraphloal environment.

15Por an excellent eXplanatlon ot Gestalt laws see Hartmann,
pp. 70-77.
16xatz , pp. 25-26.
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This point lntroduoes us to a disouss1on of the Gestalt psyCholog1st's ultImate eXplanatIon of the rules we have just stud1ed
For when we lnspect the uAtll§t! elP*anat1QB behInd the rules for
the behavioral environment we tind somethIng surprisingl

For the

Gestaltlste say that the ultImate explanation tor the behavioral
enVironment must be tound 1n the rules ot PhYsics.

Theretore,

aotlvity In the behavIoral area would seem to be governed by rules
of physics.

Kottke, tor Instanoe, makes this statement:

I admit that ln our u.tl!8t! explanatlons,

we can have but

JmJ. unlverse ot disoourse and that lt must be the one about

whlCh physlos has taught us so muoh. Not only 1s the energy
whlch Is oonsumed 1n our behavIour of chemlcal orlgln, the
forces which are responslble for each lndividual motion must
be oonsidered as phys1oo-ohemic.al system by 1tselt I although
depending for it. eXlstenoe upon a geographIcal enVironment,
and 1ts act10ns Blust be ultlmate~l explained In terms of
processes w1thin this ITstem. I an act10n i8 redUCIble to
a causal sequence of organIC processes, 1t becomes intell191ble because it Is th.en reduoed to one un1verse of dlsoours
which 1~ the same as that in whioh its aotual movements take
plaoe. i 1

The context of this statement is conoerning the inadequacy ot the
behavioral environment as an ultimate explanation, or, as Koftke
says, as the total psychologieal f1eld.

ThIs statement of Koftka'

betra,. his strong tendency toward mater1alism.

It Indicates that

1f he were torced to make a choiee, Kotfka would adhere to the
tenets of material1sm oyer all others.
The reason for our long introduction to and treatment of the
Gestalt laws, then, was mainly to po1nt out the fact that the laws

ot physics are behind the wording of the laws in each Gestalt

-
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environmental field.

We will now study some of the 1mplioatlons

resultlng from this faot.
We mlght begln our discusslon of lmpllcatlons by asking thls
quest1on:

by subJectlng the behavioral envlronment (espeolally)

to the laws of physlos does not Gestalt phyohology ellmlnate a
speolfioally phyohlc realm and hence open itself to the oharge
of mater1allsm?

This would seem to be the oonoluslon one would

d.raw from the above statements on laws.

However., the leadlng

Gestaltists, espeolally X&hler. do not tavor the appelatlon
-mater1allst.-

Thls ls obvlous from such statements as the £01-

lowlng:

In the meanttme those ldeas about physical nature whloh
once were dominant among physlclsts. and ln still cruder
form among
Materialists, have been thoroughly and torever
dlscarded. 1

ahe

And. Kof'tkaI

Thus the alleged materlalistlc b1as of our theory d1sappears. A physiolog1cal theory whlch allows to physlologloal processes more than mere summatlve oomblnatlon ot
excitations 18 le8s mater1a11st1c than psyohological theory
whloh allow8 only sensat10ns and bllnd assoolatlve bonds
between them. 1 ';
'lihe reasOD. why the Oestalt1ata do not want to be called

materlallsts ls that they claim to have a psychology whlch goes
beyond the mere material for lts explanatlons of' behavior.

The

Gestalt psyChologists, in faot, give the 1mpression of baving a

18X8hler, illu! In tne Wgrla ~

laok',

1910ffka, The frlno~Rlel • • • , p. 65.

p. 192.
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defInIte antipathy for the tenets of materIalIsm.

For they so
otten speak of suCh thIngs as -hIgher mental functlons. tt20 ·value-

and -reQUlredness,,,21 -slgnltleance and mean1llg,·22 eto.

No psy-

ohology whiCh holds such data eould be consldered an expressly
materialistIc psyohology.

The taet 1s that the Gestalt theorists

expressly repudiate materialism.
What the Gestaltists mean by suoh terms as "materialism,·
-hIgher mental funotlons," .to., is another, perhaps more pertinent, question.

In other words, the Qeataltists may be makIng

the above terms fit their own meanings and datlnitions.

In this

case their repudIatIon of materIalIsm would be merely a verbal
repudIatIon; it would not touoh the real order.

As regards what

the Gestaltlsts hold conoerning mind and mental funotions, the,
are always a bit vague. 2' They do not seem to want to be too
categorIcal as yet.

But let us look at the word -materialism"

as the oestaltlsts use It.

Here they seem to be more straight-

forward In giVing tbe1r opinIon.
In speaking of materialism, the Gestaltists often say they
do not hold "old" materialism which they det1ne as a type of

20petermann, pp. $4, 207, 2)2, 264 ft.

21K~hl.r,

V.'Ba

.m !hi. W:or 14 .9.t (ao£l.

esp. Ohs. II and III.

22Xoffka, lba Pr.nglp'e@_ • • , esp. p. 19.
23wltness 80me of the vagaries of the Gestaltlsts when
speaking of ·ooBsoiousneas." (See Koftles, lht. f£a:ao*ples ••• ,
pp. 65-66.)
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atomism. 24

They maintain that their type of materialism, if you

want to oall 1t that, 1s something "noble •• 2,5

It doe.~ not,r-e4uee

everything to mere matter, but rather gives matter a higher plaoe
of be1ng.26

This argumentation, while 1t attempts to point out

the intrinsio worth of material being, refuses to faoe the basio
faot of the essential nature of matter as opposed to mind.

It

1s oharacteristio of Gestalt dootrine not to want to adm1t any
ditferenoes (real distinction) in nature. 27

Th1s leads one to

th1nk that the Gestaltists repudiate an atomist10 materialism
not because it 1s mater1alistio but beoause atomlst1c.

And they

substltute a Gestalt mater1a11sm not beoause materia11st1c but
because Gestalt.

Koffka, in his quotat1on above 27a , 1s gettlng

at th1s very polnt w1thout reoognizing it. • •
Henoe it seems that, whl1e the Oestaltists outwardly reject
materialism, this reJectlon may be more verbal than real. 28

If

24~., pp. 11-13.
25Werthe1mer, -General Problems,· as summarlzed by Ellls; p.9

26rl2~d.
27The Oestaltiata have the tendenoy to reJeot all real d1stinctlons ln order to force all thlngs lnto their oategory of whol~
phySical struotures. Koffka denles any d1stinotlon, for 1nstance,
between quantIty and quallty (See l.Q!. frIQotpl'l • • • , pp. 1).22J .
Katz orltioizes Gestalt for shunnIng the problem of what he oalls
-multIple stratlf10atlon of oonso1ousness· (p.79). and then asks
the questlon w• • • how Gestalt theory oan explaln Ind1v1dual differenoes· ot any sort, not Just In mental-sense 11fe. (p. 16,5).
27aSee above, p. 81, n. 19.
28rh1a aeema to be the C8se when we Inspeot dI1lgently 80me

ot Koftke's statements on mater1alism (.ee quotat1on from Korfka
on the su.bjeot on p. 78 of thls thesls).
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SO, the Gestalt doctrine could be categor1zed as a t,pe

ot monlstl)

we have indioatlons ot thi. from souroes more de-

material lam.

f1nite than Just the iaplloatloD.s ot the laws.

P'or instanoe.

Kurt Kottka 8&1S 1n one place that it would be a -totall,

unl~

telllg1ble- 29 assumption to 8a1 that the phenomenal world is some-

thi:ag completel, dlfterent from thepl'l.18101os1oal.
1n

He oonclude.

thi& wa,:

Thu8, 1&omorph1811, a tera 1arp17ina Ctq,ualit7 ot forll, mak••
the bold a •• umption that the -.otlon ot the at~ and moleoulea ot the bra1n- are not -tUD4aaentall, dlfferent from
thought8 and r.ellnas- but 1n their Jl2Aar aspects, considereA
.s proc••••• ln extenalon, ldentloal. J
He oontinue. letert

Granted. the•• that our theory w11l be a molar theory, neverthel •• s, 1t 1s a purely phyaiologloal theory, even though
.ental taots,~{aot. ot direct experienoe, are used in its
oonst.ruotion. J
It 18 true that in the pa88ages quoted above Kottka a8Y8

tt~t

the

three PS1Chological flelds are the same "in their molar aspecta,·
meaningpe:rhapa merely that all three environmental f lelda are

structured.

But no matter how otten we

8a•• ~he

Oeataltlsts from

materialism, 1t 1s nevertheless tru.e that the general purport of
theIr arguments are materlallstio.)!
A orltloi.. ot Gestalt psychology aa a .,stem holdlng monistl

............ ,

.30n.. tA

31llWl_, p.64.
32 In anotber place Kot'tka aeemB to Identify Gestalt P8'1-,
ohol0i1 wlth the admIttedly materialistic psyohology of watson,
maklns the ae.taltlste "fleld-BehaYiorists.- (See IDa fr,pglP4', •
•• p.

">.
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mater1a11sm could be given, then, trom what the Gestalt1sts 1mp11citly hold.

However, suoh a cr1t1cism would be external,

argu1ng from pr1nciples extr1nsic to the system crit1oized.

A

more tell1ng cr1tique is one that is internal, arguing trom internal inoonsistencies or contrad1ctions withln the system 1tself.
This latter type ot crit101sm is what we intend to use.
The main point of criticism that we br1ng against the Gestalt
doctrine, then, i8 its internal inoonsistenoy.

The Gestaltlsts

want to keep whe.t they call higher mental funct10ns and. faots
of mental 11fe, but at the same time they want to reduce all to
a theory approachable by the laws of physiCS.

1s imposs1ble.

Suoh,s posltlon

It 1s a blatant inoonsistenoy 1n the very funda-

mental principles ot the system.
Approaohlng the matter from another direot1on we find the
8ame 1noonsistency, this time oonoerning the alleged basis Gestalt has in psyChophysical parallellsm.

Nearly all of the lead-

ing Gestalt psycbologists hold expressly that their system i8 one
of psyOhophys1cal parallel1sm.))

or

,ahler'. isomorphlsm Katz

say. that -1t may be regarded as 8 special sort of psyOhophys1cal
parall.li ••• • J4 It is log1cal for them to hold th1s beoause of
their rejection of any 1nter-oausality between the psych1c and
phys1cal orders."

But whether 1t la possible for them to hold

"peterznann, p. 56; Katz, pp. 93-94.

,4Katz , p. 93.
JSX.ot'fk.a

'l'he Pr1nclnles

••

D.

47.

8}

such a doctrine, considering the purely materialistic trend of
their whole doctr1ne, 1s doubtful.

For to hold phyChophysloal

parallellsm implles the aooeptance of a dualistio system of psyChology.

As we have seen, however, all the Oeste.l t laws and ID8ll1

ot its lmplioat1ons necessltate a monlst1c system.
adm1ts thts.

Katz h1maelt

He saY8:

But lf 1t should be considered possible to reduce mental
phenomena to phys1cal terms, w1ththe physical torm as the
irreduc1ble element, then mental phenomena w111 simply be
saorlflced to monism. However, Kahler-s often-repeated
comments on subjective phenoaena,suggest that he does not
in reality wish to make Gestalt· Paychology a physical sclence
He states that these subjective phenomena are the soundest
reallty with wh1ch psychology deals, and th1s traln of though
doeD not lead to physioal monism. It leans towards psychophysioal paralle11s., whose profundity has been increased
by Gestalt theory.)O
The lnconslstency ls evldent.

It seems that the Gestalt

theorists want to hold psychic phenomena. but at the same time
they want to hold a theorr whlch explains all phenomena accord1ng
to physioal rules.

ot eaoape.

Thls ls a dilemma which allows anly one mode

The Oestaltlsts must choose elther a mon1stic phi-

losophy or a dualistl0 one.

The, oannot take both.

And 1f they

chooae the tenets of monistl0 mater1alism, they must take the
10g10al conclusions of suoh a philosophy.
Perhapa thes. theorlsts want to keep a parallelism but one
in which both aldes ot the parallel are 1n the physlcal order.
This could be the case sinoe they ins 1st so strongly on a deflnite oleavage betw.en the physiologlcal and the behav10ral environ-

menta, a cleavage wh1ch allows no lnter-causality.

In th1s way.

perhaps, the Gestalt1sts thlnk they could hold to a certa1n monisl
or homogeneity 1n nature and at the same tlme section otf the
purely physical from the behavioral or conscious.

In such a case,

however, they would not be holding p8XOhgph78ioal parallelism but
rather

80me

torm of, let us call it, PQl81Qphys1cal parallelism.

Thus tar in this chapter we have seen the Gestalt laws and
their implications.

Bes1de •• we have given a orltlc1sm ot the

Gestalt theory on the bas1s of lnternal lnconslstenoy between
the obvlous lmplloations ot Gestalt laws (and certaln. statements
made by the Qestaltlsts) and expllclt statements by leading 0.staltlsts contrary to these implioat1ons.

Before leaVing the

subject ot Gestalt lawa, however, we would l1ke to pursue one
more aV(..dle of poss1ble oriticism.
We saw in the bei1nn1ng of this chapter that the purpose
of the Gestalt laws was to establish some basis of oertltude tor
the Gestalt theory.

able to give?

But how much certitude are the law8 aotually

A good method ot answering this que.tion 18 to

1nspeot the Gestalt oonoept ot orser, whloh ls, theoretloally,
the over-all etteot of the law8.

The Gestalt theori8ts often

refer to the ·oausal harmony·)? ln th1ngs and the ·inner forces"
by whloh phY8ical being 1s IIdlreoted-)S to a certain goal.

p.

But

37K&hler, ·SOme Gestalt problems.- as summarized by ElliS,
65.
,e~., p. 64.
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what prino1ples do they g1ve to acoount for this order and d1rect1on?

They have none.,

They reject teleolosy39and the ~ltal

prlnclple w40 of Hans Drleach and h1s followers.,

'l'he Oestalt1ata

conclude:

·Order 1s poss1ble and aotually ocours by means of
spontaneous self-struotur1ng ot related phys10al systems •. • 41 In

other words. the basiS tor Gestalt cert1tude 1s in their laws,
42
the bas1a or their laws is phys10s
and physioal order. But
here" again, the Gestalt explanation is weak.
~etween

For the diChotomy

the phys10al and behav10ral environments remains.

As

ife have seen, the G•• taIt1.ts hold that the st1mul1 never qu1te
peach us the same way as they prooeed from the obJect.,
~s

As long

these premise. are held" one can always quest10n the possi-

)ility of cert1tude with regard to the objects ot the phys10al
.nv1ronment.
~ut

There.1.l an

or4e~

in the behavioral environment,

18 1t the order of the pbys1cal?

And the basis of physical

order i8 not a set principle of any sort, rather it ls the mere
-.pontaneous self-struoturing- of the physioal system.

This seea.

11ke a rather haphazard pr1nciple to be the bas1s ot certltude

tor a system.
We tlnally oome to a question which ls perhaps the moat baslc

39werthe1mer, -Gestalt Theory,· as summar1zed by Ellla, pp.

1-8.
40lSl4 ., p. 7; Kottka. ~ frln91pleg ••• , p. 11; Katz,p.S2.
41

xatz, p. 56.

42Kotfka.

Tne

frlnp1Rl11 • • • , p. 17.
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1n allot O••talt theory.

It concerns the aestalt answer to tbe

proble. of unlty and mult1pllClty4, In psyOhological peroeptlon.
Tht. ls the problem wblch Oardnor Murphy oalls one or the moa'
Impo~tant

in oontemporary psychology. tho "lssue of whol •• and

parts.- 44

It 18 ae.talt psyoholOSY's maln bone of contentlon tn

it. reaot1on against atomlam.

The faot that thi. age old proble.

A

jA the RIls nglrl for the Oeatalt18ts leave. th•• open to the

ott-repeated charge that they are not historioally-minded and,
hence do not recogn1ze the orlgln of theIr lele.a.

a.sta1tlet. reply that:

-It 1s pertectly true

ti~t

l'o

tht.

the

the famous

problem of 'The Hany and the one' ,oes baok to the IonIan and.

E1e.tlo nature-philosophera ot pr....S.ocr.tio Gre.ee. but to bay.

ra1 ..4 or stated .. problem 1.
801.1q It •• 45

80• •1:.h10&

altogether dltter.at troa

'fhe que.tion we aak here 18.

d.oe.a.atalt pa,-

CholOS' 801y. the pro})le., at l ••st In tbe fIeld of perceptlon"
The aU8.er to thl. qu••tlon should b. found 1n the Oestalt bas1C
theory of tor. or structure.

Therefore. in thl. last part of the

th•• 18 we wl11 In.pect the ooncept of form In Gestalt theor, ot
peroeptlon.
We 1I1Sht begln this d180u •• lon by aekID« the question:
1e O.stalt psyObology'. crIter10n or wholeness or tota11ty?

4'we wl11

tal work.
h18'

Iht.

what

Put

not attempt a or1t1018. her. ot Gestalt experimenot

'l'h18 haa been ably don. by Petermann In ·Part Two"
Qtl!t.~t thlgEY &41b1. fERal!1 9.t C2nf~gurltl2Q.

"4see p. 18 or thl. the.ls.
45 u ... _ ... _
n
20B
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1n another way:

what 18 the ultimate cr1terion of form or being

or, 1f you want, substance?

The whole theory ot perception, re-

member, is built on the phenomenal experie.nce of a torm.

Thls

form seems to be a set and atable entity in the ey.a ot the 0.atalt1st. 46 And Katz aays expl101tly: 'The baale assumption

ot Gestalt 1s that a form, regarded phenomenolog1cally, 1s a tinal
and lrreduo1ble entity.,47 ihe form, then, ls the baslc entlty
for Gestalt psyohology, the tlnal answer to the problem of multlplioity.

The question ls, however, how suoh a form or structure

e ..e about 1n the flrst place.

Does the form (1) exist 1n the

real order before sensat10n takes place at all. or (2) ls it

~

R2,.A upon the outer world by the phenomenal env1ronment? The
Gestalt psycholog1sts aeem to explio1tly wish to hold the former.
(However. 1f they can be shown to hold the latter, they are open
to the oharge of !ubJ,!t.U.lm.) Thi. would even catoh the Geataltista 1n a worse torm of internal inconsistenoy than the monl. dual 1st 411emma ment10ned above.

For it the Gestalt theor1sts

wlab to maintain anything, lt is the 1dea that the1r payOhologr
18 one of absolute sclentif1c obJectlvity. a statement they never
tlre of assertlng.

But let us examlne tbe above two posslbillt1es

to •• e whiob the Gestalt1ats really hold.
(1)

There i8 no doubt that the Berlln School of Gestalt

psyChology holds that torms or structure. aotually ex1st 1n the
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physioal world.

This is qulte evident trom a study ot the theory

ot lsomorphlsm.

But when we ask for some criterion ot torm 1n

this real world, the Gestaltists have none to otfer.

It 1s very

1mportant, after all, to have such a crlterion lf one 1s to hold
that

ther~are

deflnite unlts in nature whlch are self-subsistent

and 1noommunioable.

For the question Can alway. be asked:

why

are oerta1n qua11t1es 1n nature necessarily grouped together and
others left out?

Why are certain things taken as slngle ent1tles

separate from others?

Perhaps the Qestaltlsts balk at answerlng

sUCh questions beoause they do not want to oomm1t themselves to
a definite metaphysios.

For, truly, to &nswer such queries one

would have to have a def1nite or1terion of form 1n the real order
and that would demand adm1ssion of some sort of sYRstlnce or

~

J2!l: JI.!..

(2)

On the other hand, the worda Wregarded phenomenologically· in the quotat1on above from Katz 48 make oue think that
the second mentioned poSSibility is true, namely, that the phenomenal environment 1mposes forms on reality.

In other words. the

ult1mate entity for Gestalt psyohology 1s really found in the
phenomenal order.

The Gestaltlsts prove legitimately by the

ph.nc~

.anological method that we exper1enoe structured wholes in percept1on.

But, then after that, they seem to try to submit all

other realms of being to a strict law which 1s aotually valid
only in the mind.

48See "'.

A8 •

We will now ohoose at random several quotations
note 41 ot this thesis.
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trom Fr. Herr's very informed article on Gestalt psychology to
substant1ate the above aS8ertion.
There is an 1mplic1t assumption in all this work I .•. of
Gestalt pSYChologa that every percept10n oan and must be
explalne4 by the same general law. regardless of the nature
ot the objeot. They will not change this aaaumP410n even
though 1t leads to 1nsoluble (to them) d11emmas. 9
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Kotfka ooncluded I debate on the actua11ty of sensory elementl that the un1que act of peroe1ving Gestalten 1mmed1atel'
8utrfced, and that the m1nd was the real cause of the reletedB,s; thus making the sensory stimulation merely a oond1tion.S O
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
aeetalt1sts now argued that there were Characters given in
peroeption which have no corresponding happen1ng 1n the sense
organ.5 1
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
To avoid the terrible pit of atomism theI QestaltletQ cllng
2
closely to the horn of subJeotivlsm. •

If'

In the last part of his treatise,53 Petermann expends almost
all of h1s efforts in an attempt to hang the albatl'loas of subject1vism on the Gestalt1sts.

His big oontent1on 1s that the

Oestaltlsts try to objectify preconoeived theories whioh aotually
apply only to the phenomenal order.
80

In this sense, as Petermann

ably points out. they build for themselves a whole ontological

system based on their OKnA Rr1or\stic assumptions.
We quote:

49 Herr , p. 234.
50~.,

p. 236.

51~ •• p. 2'7.
52~., p. 2)6.

S)petermann, p. 296.
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The psyohophysical oonoluslons wh10h have a central posltion
in the gestalt theory, are actually--tar indeed as they are
trom deserv1ng to rank as proven conolualons--nothlng other
than aroms of & purely philosoph1cal nature underlylng the
Whole sy stem • .5
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The gestalt theory lncludes a rad1cal ontologlzati2~ ~ Q&[CholoSX- _ • What th1s ldea of gestalt un1formity 1n real1ty
leads to phl1osophlcally, 1s that an autochthonous ontologlca1 reallty Is attrlbuted to the gestalt as such, In thls
sense: that any un1ts of reality. 80 tar as they are identitiable aa gestalten. oontaln forces, tendeno1es, modes of
aotlon, dlrectly determlned In thelr own right. whloh must
be asorlbed to them just ln vlrtue of the1r property of beIng
gestalten. 55
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The ontological subservlence of the gestalt theory to the
ultlmates we have described, betrays itself, 1n a very fundamental way, purely psyChologically, 1n reterene. to the
determination ot the contents of what must be oa11ed the
parahloally real. It enta1ls the imposItIon of 8R'9ifl0
and. Mttgr MPlr9rm~tY ~ tbe entlrl rlnge ~ PlloOol981oal

katl.'

Prom our study ot the implicatlons ot the Gestalt theory,

then, the bases ot our oritloism are easily dlsoernible.

The

Geetaltiets strive vallently to remove all shadow ot materia11sm
from theIr tenets In order to reta1n a psyohology of MInd.

But

wIth all the1r etrorts, they seem to aOh1eve nothing more than
a verbal dist1nction between the1r alleged psychophys1cal
18m, and the tenets of monlstlc materiallsm.

parallel~

The result 1s that

they produce many good potnts ot orltloism against atomIst1c
material1sm but fall to give any positlve explanatlon ot thelr
stand on materlalism.

Seoondly; 1n an etfort to maIntain oertl-

54petermann; p. 296
"Ibid. f p. 297·
S6 Tb1d
n
208
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tude, they oreate a very intricate system of laws connecting the
different environmental fields, but fail to give an adequate explanation of the basis and source of their laws.

1'he result of

this is an artiflcsl and A Rrlorlstl0 network of laws whioh seem
to be forcibly imposed upon the environments from the outs1de.
l'his leads to our f1nal or1t1oism of subjeotivism in Gestalt.
This oritioism, more than the others, strlkes at the very basis
of Gestalt princ1ples, as we have seen.
But whether or not we oan aotually hang the albatross of
subJectiv1sm--or any other albatross for that matter--on Gestalt
psychology seems to the writer to be a matter st1ll up to the
Gestalt theor1sts to choose.

For unt11 they expliCitly commit

themselves to a defin1te set of philosophical prino1ples, it w11l
be 1mpossible to pass Just Judgment on them.
they feel,

8S

Perhaps at present

Hartmann 1nt1mates, that they have "no ohoice but

to be vague or be wrong.·S1
endure for long.

But this state, of oourse, cannot

In this thesis we have already quoted Wolfgang

K&hler as having once said:

"In my opinion one cannot grasp the

position of the Gestalt theory until one has learned to wonder
about the fact of concrete articulations in the visual field.-S 8
This characteristic Gestalt spirit of "wonder" 1s basically what
the Greeks meant by "wonder,- namely, a strong intellectual curl-

S1Hartmann, p. 296
S8See pp. 28-29, note 20 of this thesis.

oa1ty and sp1r1t of 1nqu1ry.

92
It has lead the Geatalt1sts to per-

torm numberless useful and 1nspir1ng exper1ments, experiments
wh10h are even now prov1ng a defin1te oontr1but1on to the body
of modern psyChology_

It 1s hoped that the com1ng years wlll

answer some of the tantallz1ng enigmas still oonneoted with the
Gestalt theory, and further develop the seeds of truth that defln1tely are present in that theor,_
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